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Going Gunless
Dru Stevenson†
“I have told my sons that they are not under any
circumstances to take part in massacres, and that the news of
massacres of enemies is not to fill them with satisfaction or glee.
I have also told them not to work for companies which
make massacre machinery, and to express contempt for people
who think we need machinery like that.”1
INTRODUCTION
I want to waive my Second Amendment rights. I want to
do this not because I want to restrict the freedom or behaviors of
others, but because I feel overwhelming disgust and revulsion
toward guns and what they have become in our society. Yet there
is no legal mechanism for effective, binding waiver—or
renunciation—of these rights. Our legal system provides
procedures or circumstances by which one can waive other
constitutional rights, such as trial rights found in the Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Amendments, rights against searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and, effectively, waiver
of certain First Amendment rights. In fact, some constitutional
rights, according to the courts, include a constitutional right not
to do the activity, like free speech or religious expression.2 This
article proposes a system for voluntary government registration
† Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. The author would like to
thank participants in faculty workshops and forums at the Duke Law Center for
Firearms Law, South Texas College of Law, the University of Houston Law Center, and
Thurgood Marshall School of Law for helpful suggestions and constructive criticism of
the ideas presented here. Special thanks to Professors Kristin A. Goss, Lonny Hoffman,
Josh Blackman, Rocky Rhodes, Ken Williams, Amanda Cooley, and Maxine Goodman
for reviewing drafts or vetting the ideas in depth; to research assistant Sofia Colorado
and Michelle Doughtery for tracking down sources, and to my own institution for
providing institutional support and a summer writing stipend.
1 KURT VONNEGUT JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE 19 (1969).
2 See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18–
24 (2012) [hereinafter Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms] (surveying constitutional
rights not to do the activity protected by the same provision, and arguing that the Second
Amendment could be a two-way right). See generally Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 761 (2012) (exploring two-way constitutional rights generally).
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and certification of non-gun owners, those who for religious,
moral, social, or philosophical reasons want to be ineligible to
buy or possess firearms for a period of five or ten years. The
voluntary legal ineligibility would also apply to state permits
and licenses for buying, owning, carrying, or hunting with
firearms. It would constitute a waiver of all Second Amendment
rights, with a government-issued certificate or card that the
person is legally “gunless.”3
Other authors, most notably Fredrick Vars, have
proposed temporary self-enlistment on the federal National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) for those
struggling with suicidal thoughts or feelings.4 Some state
legislatures have also shown interest in voluntary systems that
temporarily limit an individual’s gun ownership rights. My
proposal is much broader, more permanent, and involves the
government issuance of official certification cards. It also serves
a different purpose for several reasons.5
First, this proposal would help create social identification
markers for the anti-gun movement, something that, at least
historically, has been missing.6 Formal signals and labels of
identification with a movement are necessary for a movement’s
success.7 Think of the sociolinguistic function of the word “vegan.”
3 This term seems appropriate because it is precisely descriptive, and it has
already been appearing in some cases and the legal academic literature. See, e.g.,
Raygoza v. Cty of L.A., 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 896, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“gunless deputy”);
Souza v. Howard, 488 F.2d 462, 463 (1st Cir. 1973) (“gunless robber”); Brian Charles
Lea, The Merits of Third-Party Standing, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 303 (2003)
(“gunless[ ] neighborhood watch”).
4 See Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, Libertarian Gun Control, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 921, 922 (2019); Fredrick E. Vars, Not Young Guns Anymore: Dementia and the
Second Amendment, 25 ELDER L.J. 51, 66 (2017); Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars,
“Bind Me More Tightly Still”: Voluntary Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 671, 673 (2016); Fredrick E. Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 1465, 1469 (2015) [hereinafter Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide].
5 Fredrick Vars and Ian Ayres have mentioned political self-expression and
associational signaling as secondary advantages of their self-registration proposal. At the
same time, the primary stated purpose of their proposal is to reduce suicide, and several
components of their proposal reflect that priority. See, e.g., Ayres &Vars, supra note 4, at 948,
966; Ian Ayres & Frederick Vars, How a “No Guns” Registry Could Help Prevent FirearmRelated Suicides, BROOKINGS (June 20, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-a-noguns-registry-could-help-prevent-firearm-related-suicides/ [https://perma.cc/ZH3D-BMMY].
This article takes these secondary points from the Vars–Ayres proposal and focuses on them,
adding some additional related ideas.
6 See generally KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR
GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006) (discussing the failure of the gun control movement to
coalesce into an effective grassroots movement or organization).
7 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR.
L. REV. 339, 340 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory] (“[L]aw changes
behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a community or society. Because people
are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signaled by
legislation and other law affects their behavior.”); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
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When someone mentions that they are vegan, the hearers can
infer a full set of implications; the individual has made a
conscious, deliberate choice about this (we do not use “vegan” for
someone who simply happens, perhaps due to poverty or food
access, to have no meat or dairy in their diet at that time), a choice
based on some larger underlying values, such as morality, a sense
of identity, health priorities, and heritage. We also know that the
self-identified vegan has had to make a cascade of other day-today decisions in order to implement their vegan lifestyle—it
affects what restaurants they choose, where they buy groceries,
and even what types of social events they frequent (barbeques
might be infrequent for them compared to others).
We do not have an equivalent to the word “vegan” for gun
ownership, but many of us feel strongly that we should not own
guns and we have made situational or social choices applying this
conviction. We are gunless by conviction, not by happenstance.
The Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller opinion
acknowledged, in both the majority and dissenting opinions, that
the original draft of the Second Amendment contained an
exemption for those “religiously scrupulous of bearing arms,” also
known as the conscientious objector exception.8 Heller attributes
the clause only to Quakers,9 though its generalized phrasing
covered multiple religious groups that at the time forbade their
followers from participating in military service. The majority was
correct, of course, in observing that “Quakers opposed the use of
arms not just for militia service, but for any violent purpose
whatsoever—so much so that Quaker frontiersmen were
forbidden to use arms to defend their families.”10 In our modern
legal system, we have conscientious objectors for both secular and
religious reasons who would not want to bear arms for personal
self-defense or to participate in military combat. The proposal in

Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (stating law helps people
coordinate activities by creating signals to interpret and predict others’ actions).
8 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589–90 (2008); id. at 661
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 591 (majority opinion); id. at 660 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting
Madison dropped the conscientious objector clause when others objected that government
officials could thereafter designate certain unpopular groups as “religiously scrupulous”
and then force them to disarm).
10 Id. at 590 (majority opinion); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409,
1468–69 (1990) (discussing early American legal concessions to nonviolent Moravians,
Quakers, and Mennonites); Ellis M. West, The Right to Religion-Based Exemptions in
Early America: The Case of Conscientious Objectors to Conscription, 10 J.L. & RELIGION
367, 375–76 (1993) (describing the tolerance of conscientious objectors from Quaker,
Brethren, and Mennonite groups).
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this article enables them to identify themselves as such—those
whom the Framers dubbed “scrupulous of bearing arms.”
In addition, voluntary registration as gunless would be a
personal moral commitment marker, analogous to declaring
oneself a conscientious objector for military service. Our legal
system, through statutes, regulations, and decisional caselaw,
recognizes “conscientious objectors” to military combat duty.11
Marking our personal moral commitments with formalities,
ceremonies, and oaths is a practice across cultures. Such
markers serve an important psychological purpose,
strengthening our resolve thereafter and making the decision
part of our sense of self. This is a mechanism to turn a choice
into an identity—part of our persona. Formalities also serve an
ex ante purpose, highlighting for ourselves the gravity of the
commitment we are about to make.
Third, there is the market-signaling effect, providing
useful information that can trigger a response from the private
sector. Suppose, for example, that liability insurers could identify
with certainty who was gun-free, and could apply an actuarialbased market response in terms of pricing their premiums, both
for individual policyholders and for businesses that find ways to
favor gunless employees, customers, subcontractors, etc.
Religious organizations with strong positions disavowing
interpersonal violence could also have their own type of nonprofit
market response, viewing certified gunlessness as a factor for
clergy ordination, sacramental duties, and other religious
activities. Analogously, but less commonly, obtaining certification
as gunless may help avoid wrongful convictions or arrests,
especially for members of communities that experience such
tragedies disproportionately. One effect I am not worried about is
that those who register as gunless will become easy or tempting
targets for criminals; empirical evidence suggests that gun
ownership attracts, rather than deters, criminals.12
11 See 32 C.F.R. § 1630.11 (Class 1–A–0: Conscientious objector available for
noncombatant military service only); 32 C.F.R. § 1630.17 (Class 1–O–S: Conscientious
objector to all military service); 32 C.F.R. § 1630.18 (alternative service for conscientious
objectors is available); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (holding
beliefs which are “purely ethical or moral,” even if not religious, which impose a moral
duty to refrain from “participating in any war at any time,” make conscientious objector
exemption applicable); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185–87 (1965) (upholding
moral but irreligious objection to combat as valid under the exemption); United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931) (“[I]n the forum of conscience, duty to a moral
power higher than the State has always been maintained.”), overruled in part by
Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
12 See David Hemenway et al., Whose Guns Are Stolen? The Epidemiology of Gun
Theft Victims, 4 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2017) (“Risk factors for having a gun stolen were
owning [six] or more guns, owning guns for protection, carrying a gun in the past
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The discussion that follows begins with a brief description
of the mechanics of the proposal itself in Part I, and situates it
within the context of the larger firearm regulation regime that is
currently in place, especially as it relates to the background check
system for gun purchases. Of course, if the proposal were to
become a reality, it would undoubtedly require some refinements.
Nevertheless, for the sake of starting the discussion, Part II sets
forth the tentative features or components of the new system,
including specific statutory and regulatory amendments that
would be necessary.
Part III explains the three main benefits of this proposal,
in turn: first, social identification markers to facilitate the growth
and cohesiveness of an anti-violence movement;13 second, the
solemnization and self-signaling effect of an official commitment,
and;14 third, the baleful market-signaling effects—that is,
removing information deficits in a way that would encourage
market-based responses.15 In addition, a fourth type of aggregated
benefit, reducing various social costs of gun prevalence through
voluntary reduction of the number of guns,16 rounds out Part III.
Each of these could serve as a standalone reason for the proposal,
and together they form a compelling case. The three main
advantages—social identity, personal resolve or self-signaling,
and improved market responses—all target those who already
hold the position that gun ownership is, on balance, socially and
personally harmful, or even wrongful. The aggregated fourth
benefit refers to a grouping of social costs or externalities of
personal gun ownership,17 such as the disturbingly widespread
problem of firearm theft,18 which constantly replenishes the
month . . . . ”); Bruce Sacerdote, Comment, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME
AND VIOLENCE 107, 108–09 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (reviewing empirical
research suggesting that guns create an inducement to burglary rather than a deterrent);
Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns and Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS
ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 74, 78 (“At the same time guns are of
considerable value to burglars, who typically prefer items that are easy to carry, easily
concealed, and have high ‘pound for pound value.’”).
13 See infra Section III.A.
14 See infra Section III.B.
15 See infra Section III.C.
16 See infra Section III.D.
17 See infra Section III.D. See generally Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, The
Social Costs of Gun Ownership, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 379, 389–90 (2006) (using statistical
analysis to derive an average annual social cost of household gun ownership between
$100 and $1,800, depending on varying elasticity rates for homicide with respect to
firearm prevalence, and assuming $1 million value for each life lost).
18 See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, 2012 SUMMARY: FIREARMS REPORTED LOST AND STOLEN 2 (2012), https://
www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/2012-firearms-reported-lost-and-stolenpdf-1/download
[https://perma.cc/WK27-WMUH]; Martin Kaste, More Guns in Cars Mean More Guns
Stolen From Cars, NPR (May 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/09/717178960/more-
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supply of guns used in crimes and sold on the black market.19
Lawfully-owned guns also become crime guns when law-abiding
owners make tragic, impulsive decisions in a state of rage,20
intoxication,21 or despair, which may not be foreseeable at the
time of purchase. Gun suicides number more than twenty
thousand per year,22 and the correlation of firearm availability
(i.e., present in the home), with suicide is well-documented.23
Unrelated to crime, there are other alarming social costs of gun
prevalence, such as the disturbingly high number of accidental
firearm injuries, which are estimated in the tens of thousands per
year, with hundreds resulting in death.24
guns-in-cars-mean-more-guns-stolen-from-cars [https://perma.cc/8WDE-J7J3] (reporting
that an “NPR survey of a sampling of police departments reveals steady increases in
reports of guns stolen from vehicles”).
19 See Brian Freskos, Guns Are Stolen in America Up to Once Every Minute.
Owners Who Leave Their Weapons in Cars Make It Easy for Thieves, TRACE (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/stolen-guns-cars-trucks-us-atlanta [https://perma.cc/3DY
U-7YN8] [hereinafter Freskos, Stolen Guns in America] (detailing the increase in gun thefts,
especially from cars, in states that liberalize firearm-carry laws); Brian Freskos, Missing
Pieces: Gun Theft from Legal Owners Is on the Rise, Quietly Fueling Violent Crime Across
America, TRACE (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.thetrace.org/features/stolen-guns-violent-crimeamerica [https://perma.cc/JSZ9-QT5A].
20 See John J. Donohue et al., Right-to-Carry Laws and Violent Crime: A
Comprehensive Assessment Using Panel Data and a State-Level Synthetic Control, 16 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 198, 204–07 (2019) (discussing pathways by which law-abiding
gun carriers become criminally violent, with specific examples).
21 See Maria Oquendo, Opioid Use Disorders and Suicide: A Hidden Tragedy,
NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/norasblog/2017/04/opioid-use-disorders-suicide-hidden-tragedy-guest-blog [https://perma.cc/3T56C9T9]; Haley Weiss, The Disturbing Trend Behind America’s Soaring Gun Deaths, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/12/gun-deaths-city-murde
rs-suicides/578812 [https://perma.cc/CX39-5R64].
22 See Joseph A. Simonetti & Ali Rowhani-Rahbar, Limiting Access to Firearms
as a Suicide Prevention Strategy Among Adults: What Should Clinicians Recommend?,
JAMA NETWORK (June 7, 2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/full
article/2735457 [https://perma.cc/2PNT-NDDP].
23 See PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 42–43 (2014); Ian Ayres, Libertarian Gun Control, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/whynot/2015/09/01/libertarian-gun-control/#3ca25a205bf3
[https://perma.cc/2AF4-9NWQ]; A.B.A., Standing Comm. on Gun Violence, Resolution
19M106B–NICS Self Reporting (Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter A.B.A., Resolution 19M106B]
(discussing suicide statistics); The Relationship Between Firearm Availability and Suicide,
RAND CORP. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/firear
m-availability-suicide.html [https://perma.cc/27QR-HJUE].
24 See, e.g., Jacob B. Avraham et al., The Epidemiology of Firearm Injuries
Managed in US Emergency Departments, 5 INJ. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2018) (“Firearm injuries
increased from 2009 to 2012, driven by adults aged 18-to-44-years-old, and disproportionately
impacting lower socioeconomic communities. Injuries also increased among young children.”);
DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 27–34 (2d ed. 2017) (surveying public
health research); Faiz Gani & Joseph K. Canner, Trends in the Incidence of and Charges
Associated with Firearm-Related Injuries Among Pediatric Patients, 2006–2014, 172 JAMA
PEDIATRICS 1195, 1195 (2018) (demonstrating that firearm injuries to children cost $270
million in hospital charges annually); How Gun Policies Affect Unintentional Injuries and
Deaths, RAND CORP. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/unint
entional-injuries.html [https://perma.cc/27QR-HJUE] (showing the number of emergency
room discharges for nonfatal firearm injuries); Madeline Drexler, Guns & Suicide: The
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The proposal outlined here is low-cost but promises high
benefits; it supplies something that has been missing up until
now in our firearm policy and public discourse, while not
infringing on anyone’s Second Amendment rights. We are in dire
need of an official mechanism to designate one’s permanent
choice not to own firearms, a need that this proposal aims to fill.
I.

THE PROPOSAL: VOLUNTARY REGISTRATION OF
NONOWNERS OF GUNS

“Normalizing the idea that we should all go around
capable of a lethal act at any moment is completely corrupt and
crazy. I wouldn’t carry a gun. The reason I wouldn’t carry a gun
is because it is an immoral act walking around imagining you’re
going to kill someone. It’s a recipe for a completely deranged
society. It’s grotesque.”25
Many people are without guns by happenstance—they
simply have not acquired one yet, but may in the future, and others
simply prefer to spend their money on other things. Under federal
law, millions of individuals with prior felony convictions cannot
legally possess a firearm, nor can undocumented immigrants,
those adjudicated mentally ill, those under a domestic violence
restraining order, or those with a domestic violence misdemeanor.26
Some of us, however, do not have firearms because of personal
convictions, even when firearm purchases would be lawful,
convenient, and affordable for us. The proposal outlined in this
Part is for these individuals.
There is a movement—albeit a disorganized and incredibly
diverse movement—of those who oppose gun ownership due to its
contribution to the epidemic of gun violence. Many, like the youth
movements that emerged after the Parkland school massacre, are
reacting against gun violence in our society. For some, like this
author, the conviction against firearm use derives from religious
beliefs.27 Several faiths, or at least subdivisions or denominations

Hidden Toll, HARV. PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/magazine/magazine_artic
le/guns-suicide/ [https://perma.cc/5QK9-729Y]; Brendan G. Carr et al., Unintentional Firearm
Death Across the Urban-Rural Landscape in the United States, 73 J. TRAUMA & ACUTE CARE
SURGERY 1006, 1006–10 (2012).
25 Eric Allen Been, Why Carrying a Gun Is An Immoral Act, According to
Marilynne Robinson, VOX (Mar. 5 2018), https://www.vox.com/conversations/2018/3/5/1707
2260/marilynne-robinson-florida-parkland-shooting-guns [https://perma.cc/YF8H-A5FG]
(quoting Marilynne Robinson).
26 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
27 See David B. Kopel, Pacifist-Aggressives vs. The Second Amendment: An
Analysis of Modern Philosophies of Compulsory Non-Violence, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1,
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within the larger faiths, teach some variation of personal and
political pacifism.28 Within Christianity, the Amish,29
Anabaptists,30
Christadelphians,31
Hutterites,32
Jehovah’s
33
34
35
Witnesses, Moravians (originally), Mennonites, Molokans,36
Quakers,37 various Brethren denominations,38 certain Pentecostal
groups,39 Adventists,40 some Catholic orders41 and other religious
7 (2008) (“Thus, it seems clear that religiously motivated pacifism plays a significant role
in supporting anti-gun movements in the United States and elsewhere.”).
28 See generally PETER BROCK, PACIFISM IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
COLONIAL ERA TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1968).
29 See id. at 792–96 (discussing Amish pacifism in the Civil War era); see also
Slabaugh v. United States, 474 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1973) (discussing an Amish
conscientious objector case).
30 See BROCK, supra note 28, at 596–97.
31 See id. at 861–66 (discussing history of Christadelphian pacifism, and how it
differed in subtle ways from other sects’ pacifism); Brent D. Thomas, Comment, The Impact
of the Gulf War on Conscientious Objectors, 61 UMKC L. REV. 67, 73 n.61 (1992); Timothy G.
Todd, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1734 n.4. (1969).
32 See Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 291 P.3d 1231,
1234 (Mont. 2012) (discussing history of Hutterite movement, including its pacifist roots,
and its community in Montana); Decker ex rel. Decker v. Tschetter Hutterian Brethren,
Inc., 594 N.W.2d 357, 361 n.8 (S.D. 1999) (“Hutterites are pacifists.”); BROCK, supra note
28, at 891–93 (discussing Hutterite pacifism in the United States before the Civil War);
Jennifer Carr, Complicity and Collection: Religious Freedom and Tax, 11 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 183, 196 (2014) (discussing Hutterite nonviolence).
33 See United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1954) (Jehovah’s Witness
conscientious objector case). For the organization’s official doctrinal position, see Why Don’t
Jehovah’s Witnesses Go to War?, JW.ORG, https://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/whydont-you-go-to-war/ [https://perma.cc/8DZJ-CWXW].
34 See BROCK, supra note 28, at 285–321 (discussing Moravian pacifism during
the Colonial and Revolutionary eras); id. at 321–29 (discussing Moravian pacifism
during the nineteenth century).
35 See id. at 159–68 (discussing Mennonite pacifism in the Colonial era); id. at 889–
905 (discussing Mennonite pacifism, and the pacifism of offshoot groups after the Civil War).
36 See, e.g., Dobrenen v. United States, 235 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1956) (Molokan
conscientious objector case); Klubnikin v. United States, 227 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1955) (same);
Chernekoff v. United States, 219 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1955) (same); Kalpakoff v. United States,
217 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1954) (same); see also William Haas Moore, Prisoners in the Promised
Land: The Molokans in World War I, 14 J. ARIZ. HIST. 281 (1973) (describing the plight of
Molokan conscientious objectors in Arizona during the First World War draft).
37 See BROCK, supra note 28, at 21–158 (describing the Quaker pacifist
movement in the early American Colonies); id. at 333–88 (describing Quaker pacifism
between the War of Independence and the American Civil War); see also District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589–90 (2008).
38 See Hanauer v. Elkins, 141 A.2d 903 (Md. 1958) (conscientious objector case); Ware
v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 424 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that Plymouth
Brethren had official conscientious objector status with the Selective Service System).
39 See Ilchuk v. Attorney Gen., 434 F.3d 618, 620–21 (3d Cir. 2006) (Pentecostal
applicant for asylum fled Ukraine to avoid mandatory military service there); Movsisian v.
Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (Pentecostal asylum applicant fled Armenia to
avoid mandatory military service there); Michael F. Noone, Jr., Rendering Unto Caesar: Legal
Responses to Religious Nonconformity in the Armed Forces, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1233, 1283–84
(1987) (describing the case of Pentecostal conscientious objector in 1967).
40 See BROCK, supra note 28, at 843–60 (discussing the history of Adventist
pacifism leading up to the Civil War); United States v. Newton, 435 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
1970) (Adventist conscientious objector case).
41 For example, the Franciscan Third Order renounces the use of weapons. See
Third Order of Francis, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Order_of_Saint_
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societies have valued pacifism or nonviolence as an important part
of their heritage. Many of these groups contend that for three
hundred years before Constantine, early Christianity taught
adherents that they should not carry weapons or participate in
war.42 Similarly, Bahai,43 Jainism,44 some Hindus and Buddhists,45
and some Sufi orders46 teach nonviolence. Apart from religion,
many secular individuals have philosophical reasons to reject
violence. Like religion, philosophical views come in many
variations, but there are many people who would choose never to
have a gun because of their personal convictions and sense of
identity. Even those who believe that some wars, violence, and use
of force by the state are morally justifiable under specific
extenuating circumstances may view individual ownership and use
of guns for self-defense as a special problem or source of evil. The
following sections will explain the practical aspects of the proposal
itself, and how it differs from a gun owner registry.
A.

Implementation of the Proposal

Under this proposal, individuals who do not own guns due
to their convictions could submit an online registration form,
accompanying affidavit or declaration, and supporting
identification, with a government agency. For the sake of
illustration, suppose the agency would be either the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)47 or Federal

Francis [https://perma.cc/Z2J9-PB4G] (“Because of the prohibition of bearing arms, the
followers of this rule came into conflict with local authorities, which customarily required men
to carry arms for service in militias.”).
42 For an excellent documentary history of early Christian pacifism and
nonviolence, see THE EARLY CHURCH ON KILLING (Ronald J. Sider ed., 2012).
43 See Adam E. Frey, Serving Two Masters: A Scheme for Analyzing Religious
Accommodation Requests in the Military, 74 A.F. L. REV. 47, 78 n.182 (2015) (“For
example, Jainism, the Baha’i faith, and certain Christian denominations tend to be
pacifist.”); see also United States v. Hanson, 460 F.2d 337, 338–39 (8th Cir. 1972)
(Bahai conscientious objector case).
44 See Frey, supra note 43.
45 See Kuk Cho, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Korea: The
Rocky Path from Being an Unpatriotic Crime to a Human Right, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 187,
192–97 (2007) (discussing Buddhist conscientious objectors and pacifists); Frey, supra
note 43, at 78–81; see also Hager v. Sec’y of Air Force, 938 F.2d 1449, 1451–52 (1st Cir.
1991) (conscientious objector case based on Hindu Ahimsa and Buddhist teachings).
46 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Evolving Approaches to Jihad: From Self-Defense
to Revolutionary and Regime-Change Political Violence, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 119, 136 (2007)
(describing “the ascetic spiritual Sufi movement which was essentially pacifist”);
Mohamed Abdel Dayem & Fatima Ayub, In the Path of Allah: Evolving Interpretations
of Jihad and Its Modern Challenges, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67, 90 n.88 (2008)
(describing the advent of Sufi pacifism).
47 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES, www.atf.gov
[https://perma.cc/6LV6-58DY].
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Bureau of Investigation (FBI),48 or one of the lesser-known
components of the Department of Justice (DOJ), such as the Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services.49 The form would declare
that the filer owns no firearms, does not live in a residence where
others keep firearms (though this provision is not entirely
necessary if it proves too problematic), does not carry an employerissued firearm at the workplace, and will not acquire or use a
firearm for a period of five or more years, though the proposal does
not depend on a specific number of years. Registrants would legally
surrender or forfeit any previously held permits, registration, or
licenses from any state or municipality for concealed carry, open
carry, hunting, selling, or ownership of firearms. Submitting a false
application or affidavit would carry the same penalties as
submitting other false forms or affidavits to the federal
government—up to five years imprisonment.50 Under existing
statutes, without any new legislation, possessing a firearm at the
time of registration would constitute a felony of making false
statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, as would registering with the
intent of acquiring firearms thereafter, i.e., fraudulently promising
not to own guns.51 The responsible agency would issue a
certification card to the individual. The most basic and essential
components of this proposal are self-registration (a legal
declaration), and official certification. Dispossession would be
irrevocable for five years, or whatever period the enacting law
stipulates, though obviously anyone could petition a court to find
the declaration and certification void due to coercion, duress, or
incapacity at the time it was made.
The registering agency would electronically submit the
names of these volunteering individuals into the NICS Index,
one of the three databases included in the National Instant
Background Check System.52 Self-inclusion in the NICS Index,
an idea already proposed by other authors for purposes of suicide
prevention,53 effectively bars the individual from purchasing a
firearm from a licensed gun dealer. In states with universal
background checks, these individuals will be barred from
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, www.fbi.gov [https://perma.cc/YD9U-KRUW].
See COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, https://cops.usdoj.gov/
[https://perma.cc/UNL8-7FND].
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Any version of my proposal that still effectuates
government registration and certification could trigger charges of “mak[ing] a[ ]
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement” under this statute. Id.
51 See United States v. Shah, 44 F.3d 285, 293 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying Section
1001 to false promises to the government).
52 See National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/nics [https://perma.cc/3C7VZFC7] [hereinafter NICS].
53 See sources cited supra note 4.
48
49
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purchasing guns from most private sellers as well. This makes
the certification more meaningful for third parties going
forward, especially licensed gun dealers and private unlicensed
sellers of firearms, because they could rely on the certification to
mean that the person was on the do-not-sell list.
An additional component, completely optional for the
proposal overall, would be a single-sentence statutory provision
that would designate the “certified gunless” individuals as
“prohibited persons” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),54 though this
designation would subject individuals only to fines for possession,
not imprisonment or a felony conviction. This component would
intensify the seriousness of certification and would work to
prevent a registrant from changing their mind and trying to buy
or borrow a gun from a private unlicensed seller in their state, as
most states do not require private sellers to do background checks
on prospective purchasers.55 On the other hand, if Congress
passes a universal background check requirement, this
component would be unnecessary.
The Vars proposal seeks to protect the self-registrants’
privacy,56 which makes perfect sense given the unfortunate
social stigma associated with those who suffer from mental
illness and suicidal thoughts. In contrast, those who are gunless
as a matter of strong personal conviction will often prefer
instead to publicize their certification, which is why issuance of
an official certificate is an essential feature. The government
would not have to disclose or publicize the names of those with
a gunless certification, though that would be welcome by many
of us; even without government disclosure, we could broadcast
our certification on social media and show our certification cards
to others whenever we choose.
54 From a legislative standpoint, the one-line statutory provision could either be an
amendment to section 922(g) itself or could simply incorporate it by reference in the enacting
statute the self-registration and certification program. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
55 According to the updated survey of state requirements on the Giffords Law
Center site, at least twenty-two states and Washington DC now require a background
check to at least some private sales, but the other states, such as Texas and Florida, do not.
See Universal Background Checks, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/policy-areas/background-checks/universal-background-checks/ [https://perma.cc/W9
UW-XSJC]. Of these minority states that require background checks for private sales,
thirteen (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and the District of
Columbia) impose a background check requirement at the point of sale for all sales and
transfers of all classes of firearms, while a few others require them only for certain guns,
or require a background check for a purchase permit but not at the point of sale. See id.;
see also WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R45970, GUN CONTROL: NATIONAL
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) OPERATIONS AND RELATED
LEGISLATION 1 (2019).
56 See Ayres & Vars, supra note 4, at 939 n.72.
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This registration—going gunless—would be completely
voluntary. It would constitute an informed, consensual waiver of
the person’s right to bear arms. It would not infringe on anyone
else’s Second Amendment rights. Joseph Blocher has argued
convincingly that the Second Amendment includes a right not to
have guns, that is, to exclude firearms from one’s property or
business if one believes that this is necessary for self-defense.57
The idea presented here goes beyond concerns for my personal
safety. I am arguing that gun ownership is a vice, a vice that
contributes to social decay and the overall prevalence of violence,
and I think there are millions of Americans who agree. If such a
Second Amendment is indeed a two-way right, like the First
Amendment against compelled speech, association, or religious
expression,58 that would certainly support the proposal here;
nonetheless, the proposal here is merely a statutory initiative,
and is at least permissible under the Second Amendment.59
B.

Rationale for the Proposal

There may be a number of ways to achieve any given
policy initiative—new statutes versus amendments to existing
statutes, regulations versus statutory enactments, and private
sector alternatives in place of government action. This section
will address the particular means proposed in this article.
1. Why Amend Existing Statutes Rather Than Create a
New Statute?
Rather than propose a model statute, I attempt to
propose single-sentence amendments to existing U.S. Code
sections, and as few of those as possible. One objective here is
legislative minimalism—to design the proposal to require the
least amount of legislation possible.60 This is partly because any
full-length statute related to firearms is susceptible to partisan
See Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, supra note 2, at 4.
See id. at 18–24.
59 As an illustration of the difference between safety concerns and moral or
religious approbation, Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller provide an example in their
book of an organization of pacifists who own a restaurant or furniture store who would
not want patrons to bring guns on their property, not because of safety concerns, but due
to their identity as pacifists. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE
SECOND AMENDMENT: RULES, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 162 (2018)
(“Even if having or allowing the gun made the person or society safer, the autonomy
rationale would say that the individual choice should be respected.”).
60 See John P. Hennigan, Jr., Toward Regularizing the Bankruptcy
Appealability Statutes, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 365, 368 (1997) (taking a similar approach
to proposals for bankruptcy reform).
57
58
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gridlock, even if the proposed law does not directly interfere with
the rights of gun owners.
Legislative minimalism also serves another purpose.
There is a virtue in seeking as little disruption to the existing
legal framework as possible. Minimal or incremental changes
result in less uncertainty about how courts or agencies will
interpret ambiguous wording, and create less risk of unforeseen
constitutional challenges.61
2. Government Versus Private?
Could the private sector operate a gunless certification
program without state action? The temperance movement relied
entirely on teetotaler pledges administered and enforced by local
chapters of the movement, at least for its first century or so—
there was no government certification necessary, and the pledge
movement was wildly successful, as far as social movements go.62
In theory, a similar private-sector program could work today,
especially if some private grant foundations funded the
proliferation of local chapters, recruitment efforts, and a reliable
verification system for gunless certification.
On the other hand, society has changed dramatically since
the days of the temperance movement, when most Americans
lived in small towns and villages and everyone was aware of what
everyone else was doing. In small, intimate communities,
adherence to one’s vow, or lapses (a drunken binge) would be
known to many neighbors, relatives, and acquaintances. It must
have been easier to monitor and enforce social norms in
premodern America, for better or worse. Some government
participation, such as the low-cost self-registration with NICS
and issuance of an official certificate, could be necessary, given
the anonymity and information costs in modern society. In
addition, presenting the idea first as a system of government
registration and certification helps work out the details of such a
proposal, and therefore may in fact spur the development of a
workable, nongovernmental alternative that accomplishes the
same goals. Finally, some government action seems more
appropriate than private action given the government’s historical
role in providing external patronage to the pro-gun movement.63
61 See id. at 367 (“[A]voiding unnecessary special legislation saves the costs of
enacting and interpreting it.”).
62 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 62–65 (describing the history and reasons for
success of the Prohibition Movement).
63 See id. at 74–76 (describing the history and impact of government support for the
gun industry and the National Rifle Association). For a historical account of how government
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The Nomenclature

The highly variable personal convictions and religious
philosophies that drive individuals to refuse gun ownership beg
the question of what to call this proposed system. For example,
personal opposition to guns ranges from advocating for a
complete ban, to favoring moderate regulations and background
checks, to a mere distaste for guns and gun-related hobbies.
Among religious groups with tenets of nonviolence, some would
forbid killing animals as well as humans, while others allow
hunting and slaughterhouses, but not lethal force against other
humans. Still others focus mostly on teaching against militarism
and warfare, due to the large-scale casualties and the ambiguous
or mixed political motivations that drive nations to war. This
problem with nomenclature requires some clarification.
“Pacifism” is now so inextricably associated with antiwar
movements64 that it would be a misnomer in the context of
individuals eschewing ownership of a specific type of weapon, like
firearms. A person could be a self-described “pacifist” for purposes
of opposing wars and military interventions abroad, but still own
a gun for hunting or self-defense. Conversely, someone (like this
author) could believe that military interventions are sometimes,
albeit rarely, justifiable—for example, to stop the Nazi rampage
of conquest and end the Holocaust in World War II—but the same
person could also believe that there is no reason for a civilian
suburbanite in modern America to have a handgun. So, “pacifism”
will not work as the moniker for this latter type of person.
“Nonviolent” is also not the right word, though strict nonviolence
would be a subset of the larger group of those who disavow gun
use or ownership. For example, some who disdain guns still
believe it is morally permissible to use some physical restraint or
limited force to stop an assault in progress, to fend off a felonious
home intruder, to block a would-be suicide bomber from entering
support of the firearms industry contributed to the development of the American industrial
sector, see generally LINDSAY SCHAKENBACH REGELE, MANUFACTURING ADVANTAGE: WAR, THE
STATE, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1776–1848 (2019).
64 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 590 (2008); Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336–38 (1970) (philosophical non-religious conscientious
objector refused to cooperate with military conscription order); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116,
121–23 (1966) (pacifist elected to Congress excluded from his seat in the House); see also
Hannibal Travis, Postmodern Censorship of Pacifist Content on Television and the Internet,
25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 47 (2011) (exploring “censorship of pacifist and
antiwar speech”); Recent Developments, Pacifism Must Be Result of Specific Training to
Allow Naturalization, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1233–36 (1956) (discussing immigration
case rejecting the pacifism of a candidate for naturalization because he did not belong to a
religious sect that taught antiwar ideals); John L. Luvaas, A Pacifist in the Service,
EXPERIENCE, Fall 2001, at 29 (recounting experience serving as a conscientious objector in
the military during WWII).
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a crowded public event, or to restrain a person who is out of their
mind and out of control.
“Gun-free” is more accurate and is also catchy, but the
term already has strong associations with places rather than
people. We have gun-free zones such as schools,65 parks,66 and
military bases,67 and we talk of gun-free communities.68 We need
a term to describe a person who does not want to own a gun as a
matter of personal conviction. As mentioned in the Introduction,
“gunless” has appeared in a few case decisions69 and seems more
descriptive, so for now, it seems to be the best option.
II.

THE PROPOSAL: MECHANICS

Beginning with a discussion of the registration process and
concluding with a description of individuals who may not register
as gunless, this Part will discuss the details of my proposal.
A.

Registration and Certification

This proposal is for a federal registration and certification
program, though it could also work on the state level.70

65 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995) (striking down the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990); Gallinger v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 1012, 1014–15 (9th Cir.
2018) (upholding constitutionality of California’s amended Gun-Free School Zone Act).
66 See, e.g., Bridgeville Rifle & Pistol Club, Ltd. v. Small, 176 A.3d 632, 661–62 (Del.
2017) (ban on guns in state parks and forests unconstitutional); People v. Chairez, 104 N.E.3d
1158, 1178–79 (Ill. 2018) (ban on guns within one thousand feet of public park unconstitutional).
67 See Katie Rose Guest Pryal, Heller’s Scapegoats, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1439, 1459 n.85
(2015); Ryan Kearney, Right-Wingers Are Blaming Bill Clinton for the Navy Yard Shooting,
NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 17, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/114748/navy-yard-shootingclinton-blamed-bush-era-military-gun-order [https://perma.cc/PP5J-4CMJ] (tracing the
origin of the gun ban on military bases to Donald Atwood’s Department of Defense Directive
5210.56, issued on February 25, 1992).
68 See Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct
Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. 295, 319 (2016) (using the term for neighborhoods); Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103,
122 n.47 (1987) (mentioning gun-free communities).
69 See sources cited supra note 3; see also Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in
America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use of Firearms, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE
RES. BRIEF, May 1997, at 1–3 (using the term for nonowners of guns). Pro-gun advocates
sometimes use the word “hoplophobe” pejoratively to describe those pushing for more
regulation of firearms. See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 405 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J.,
dissenting) (“Constitutional rights must not give way to hoplophobia.”); Erik Luna, The .22
Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 53, 56 (2002) (quoting a newspaper letter to the
editor piece using the word “hoplophobe”); Philip Weiss, A Hoplophobe Among the Gunnies,
NY TIMES (Sept. 11, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/11/magazine/a-hoplophobe-am
ong-the-gunnies.html [https://perma.cc/GZA3-B6HH].
70 A government agency would have to undertake this program, which from an
administrative law standpoint would probably require a legislative enactment (an enabling
statute or amended enabling statute). However, some agencies could proceed with the

194

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

Government-issued
permits,
licenses,
certificates,
and
registrations are pervasive in our modern regulatory state.
Governments certify teachers and lawyers, they license drivers,
physicians, therapists, and barbers, and they register sex
offenders, businesses, and political campaigns. All states have
some way to issue permits for carrying a concealed weapon,
except for the fifteen “constitutional carry” states.71
For the sake of discussion, let us assume hypothetically
that the ATF, FBI, or the DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services creates this program with Congressional
authorization.72 The self-registration could be entirely online, as
long as there were sufficient safeguards against registering
someone else, such as requiring multiple confidential identifiers
(i.e., social security, driver’s license, or passport number). A
registrant may include a short, formulaic affidavit or legal
declaration to accompany the form as an attachment, as
individuals do when filing their income tax returns.
The application and declaration will certify the following:
(1) that the registrant does not own any firearms, does not hold or
store others’ firearms, and does not dwell with anyone who
possesses a firearm, and; (2) that the registrant will not obtain,
store, or use a firearm during the next five years.73 The application
and attached affidavit would be subject to the existing federal
penal statute regarding submission of false statements to a federal
agency,74 violation of which can result in fines or imprisonment of
up to five years.75 The voluntary legal ineligibility would be a
forfeiture of all state permits and licenses for buying, owning,
carrying, or hunting with firearms. The responsible agency would
then issue an official certification letter and wallet-size card
program via agency-promulgated directives, procedures, and regulations, as many
enabling statutes are open-ended enough to allow agencies the latitude to create a program.
71 At the time of this writing, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wyoming, though several states have pending bills to adopt such a law. See
Constitutional Carry, GUNLAWS.COM, https://www.gunlaws.com/ConstitutionalCarryIndex.
htm [https://perma.cc/CTR8-K23U].
72 This does not have to always be a federal agency program; individual states could
also implement their own system via the state police or other state law enforcement agency.
73 In anticipation of the objection that some situations may arise in which a
person can show that they registered under duress, coercion, incompetency, or some
other circumstance that would render the irrevocability of the registration inequitable,
I presume that a court could adjudicate the case accordingly and order that that the
registration is null and void.
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Producing a counterfeit certificate would trigger
criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents, authentication features, and information); 18 U.S.C. § 1038,
which criminalizes conveyance of false information and hoaxes, might also apply and
also imposes fines or a five-year prison sentence.
75 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3).
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certifying that the individual is legally not a gun owner. If the
individual owns guns, they would immediately have to dispossess
themselves by selling, gifting, or surrendering the firearms.
Next, the certifying agency would submit the names of
registrants to the NICS,76 meaning registrants would be unable to
pass a background check to buy a gun from a licensed dealer.
Issuance of a certificate card, however, is necessary for the
proposal—some government entity would have to issue a card, like
a Social Security card or a state driver’s license, identifying the
registrant as officially, legally gunless. An official letter or pagesized certificate would also work, but is less desirable—for reasons
explained below, the registrant will need to be able to display her
certification easily to insurance agents, health care providers, law
enforcement, retailers, and security guards. Submission of names
to the NICS Index should be low-cost and automatically computergenerated; agencies can submit to the NICS Index either through
a direct telecommunication line between the FBI and a Criminal
Justice Information Services Systems Agency or through the Law
Enforcement Enterprise Portal.77
If for some reason the certifying agency cannot or will not
submit the registrants to the NICS Index, it should be possible for
individuals to do it themselves. NICS already has a program, the
Voluntary Appeal File (VAF), whereby individuals subject to
mistaken denials—say, because they share the same name as a
convicted felon—can apply for a verification program to avoid
mistaken denials in the future.78 This is relatively rare—a
comprehensive audit by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
in 2016 found that NICS background denials were 99.8 percent
accurate.79 Yet there are over two million NICS background
checks per month,80 which means around four thousand errors per
month, though the OIG audit determined that these were mostly
wrongful approvals, rather than mistaken denials.81 The VAF
See NICS, supra note 52.
See id.; LAW ENFORCEMENT ENTERPRISE PORTAL (LEEP), https://www.
fbi.gov/services/cjis/leep [https://perma.cc/W243-NHUY].
78 See 28 C.F.R. § 25.10 (correction of erroneous system information); Appeals
and Voluntary Appeal File (VAF), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.go
v/services/cjis/nics/national-instant-criminal-background-check-system-nics-appeals-vaf
[https://perma.cc/DAY7-LHQM] [hereinafter VAF Brochure].
79 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE
HANDLING OF FIREARMS PURCHASE DENIALS THROUGH THE NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM ii (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1632.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UDG6-YVXJ] [hereinafter OIG AUDIT].
80 For an up-to-date, month-by-month/year-to-year table of NICS background checks,
see NCIS Firearm Background Checks: Month/Year, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS,
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/nics_firearm_checks_-_month_year.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/WL4R-VMG8].
81 See OIG AUDIT, supra note 79, at 19.
76
77
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resembles, in some ways, the TSA precheck or preclearance
programs.82 An individual submits certain documentation to the
NICS Section, and once verified, the name appears with others in
a list of those who have been prescreened for purchasing a gun.83
They still have to submit a completed background check form for
firearm purchases, a Form 4473, with subsequent purchases from
federal firearm licensees (licensed dealers), but the NICS
background check identifies the name as being on the list of
precleared individuals, so the permission will issue immediately.
If NICS already has a list or database of voluntary self-registrants
for lawful gun purchasers, it is certainly feasible to have the same
arrangement whereby people can voluntarily register to be
ineligible. Registration means a registry—an electronic database
of all the gunless registrants—that would be easily accessible to
federal, state, and local government officials, especially law
enforcement. The registry would be unavailable to the public. If
registrants want to identify themselves publicly, they can do so
with their certification card.
There remains the problem of aftermarket sales and
possession.84 Experts estimate that the number of used guns that
change hands in private person-to-person transfers each year is
about a fifth of the number of retail sales of new guns.85
Currently, the U.S. House of Representatives has already
passed a bipartisan bill for universal background checks,86 but
its future in the Senate is still uncertain. Universal background
checks would require a NICS query, or an equivalent substitute,
for private sales of firearms—a gun owner selling a rifle from
her own collection to an acquaintance or online buyer, for
See generally VAF Brochure, supra note 78.
See id.
84 This issue presents a major difference between my proposal and the VarsABA suicide prevention proposals: the latter explicitly exempt registrants from any
penalization for possession, and instead merely restrict purchases. See A.B.A.,
Resolution 19M106B, supra note 23 (“Registrants who are later found to be in possession
of a firearm would not be subject to criminal prosecution . . . . Limiting easy access to
firearms is the goal, not punishing individuals who, perhaps in a suicidal crisis, manage
to get their hands on guns from other sources.”).
85 See KROUSE, supra note 55, at 9; Kate Masters & Lois Beckett, Fewer
Americans Are Acquiring Guns Without a Background Check, Survey Finds, TRACE (Jan.
3, 2017, 9:06 AM), https://www.thetrace.org/2017/01/gun-background-check-privatesale-loophole/ [https://perma.cc/N55E-4KG7] (discussing new research that suggests
only 26 percent of purchasers now do so without a background check). Older sources
suggested higher percentages. See Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 70 (1995) (“Based on an estimate of the fraction of guns in
private hands that were acquired used, we can extrapolate, under certain assumptions,
an estimate of the number of used guns that change hands each year. Given the fiftyfifty split in acquisitions, our best estimate is that there are roughly as many
transactions of used guns as there are sales of new guns.”).
86 Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019, H.R. 8, 116th Cong. (2019).
82
83
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example—and someone registered under this proposal would not
pass the background check. If the bill does not pass the Senate,
the status quo is that most states do not require background
checks for private sales in which no licensed dealer is involved.
In that case, even an individual who has a gunless certification
could buy a gun from an acquaintance or from a private seller
online, or from a nondealer’s booth at a gun show.87 Similarly,
even if a person obtained gunless certification and could not
purchase any firearms, they might still come into possession of
guns through gifts, borrowing, cohabiting with someone who
keeps a private arsenal, or storing guns for others.88 Ten percent
or more of the private transfers of used guns are gratuitous,89
and half of violent youth offenders receive their guns by gifts and
finds.90 Gift transfers of guns between relatives would be exempt
even from the expanded background check bill that passed the
House and is currently pending in the Senate.91 These scenarios
would violate the pledge the person made when they registered
and obtained certification. If the person did not intend to do this
at the time of registration, but changed their minds later and
received some guns, Section 1001, which penalizes intentionally
false statements on federal forms, would not apply.
87 Vars discusses this problem in his proposal for self-registration to prevent
suicides, and he offers a plausible answer: private sales take more time to arrange, or
for delivery, than a walk-in purchase at the nearest sporting goods store or gun shop.
See Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, supra note 4, at 1498. I think he is correct
regarding impulsive, self-destructive purchases, but the delays involved in private sales
are less reassuring for the proposal set forth here.
88 See Philip J. Cook & Harold A. Pollack, Reducing Access to Guns by Violent
Offenders, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI., 2, 4 (2017) (discussing surveys of prisoners
that indicate that obtaining guns through loans, gifts, sharing, and thefts are common.);
James B. Jacobs & Zoe A. Fuhr, Universal Background Checking—New York’s SAFE Act,
79 ALB. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (2016) (mentioning the option of obtaining guns as a gift, loan,
or sale); Philip J. Cook et al., Some Sources of Crime Guns in Chicago: Dirty Dealers, Straw
Purchasers, and Traffickers, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 730 (2015) (noting that
juveniles obtain guns almost entirely from informal sources like theft, gifts, and loans, or
they find discards); Philip J. Cook et al., Sources of Guns to Dangerous People: What We
Learn by Asking Them, 79 PREVENTATIVE MED. 28, 34 (2015) [hereinafter Cook et al.,
Sources of Guns] (discussing gift transfers between gang members).
89 See Cook et al., Sources of Guns, supra note 88, at 30 (“About one in six are
temporary arrangements involving a gun owned by someone else, and take the form of
borrowing, renting, or holding the gun. Perhaps surprisingly, one in ten guns are gifts—
but gifting of guns is also quite common in the population at large.”); Cook et al., supra
note 85, at 69 (citing other surveys to support the 10 percent figure).
90 See Daniel W. Webster et al., How Delinquent Youths Acquire Guns: Initial
Versus Most Recent Gun Acquisitions, 79 J. URB. HEALTH 60, 60 (2002) (“About half of
the first gun acquisitions were gifts or finds. The first guns youths acquired were usually
obtained from friends or family. The most recent acquisitions were often new, highcaliber guns, and they came from acquaintances or drug addicts.”).
91 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., IF11121, FIREARM BACKGROUND
CHECKS: CURRENT FEDERAL FRAMEWORK AND THE HOUSE-PASSED PROPOSALS IN THE
116TH CONGRESS VERSION 2 (2019).
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Enforcing the promise to remain gunless could require no
more than a one-line statutory addition. One option, for example,
would be a short amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which lists the
federal “prohibited persons” for firearm possession.92 Similarly, a
provision in another statute could incorporate § 922(g) by
reference, such as a statute explicitly authorizing a certain agency
to operate the registration and certification program described
here, or an existing statute relating to the delegated powers that
the agency already has. An even more modest proposal would be
an addition to § 922(x), which currently bans juveniles from
buying guns but does not carry the same incarceration penalties
as § 922(g).93 Of course, there could also be a new standalone
subsection to § 922.
In any case, it seems appropriate that a person who
obtains official certification as gunless but then secretly reneges
should be subject to civil fines and uncompensated forfeiture of
any firearms or ammunition they acquired in violation of their
official pledge. On the other hand, it seems inappropriate to
subject the lapsed registrant to any prison time or a criminal
conviction. The advantage of incorporating a provision into
§ 922(g), or incorporating § 922(g) by reference, is the lower
legislative transaction cost of a one-line incremental change to a
long-standing statutory regime, rather than the creation of
entirely new code sections.94 The serious disadvantage of using
§ 922 is that it is a penal statute, and the related sentencing
guideline sections impose daunting incarceration sanctions.95 Any
amendment provision under my proposal would have to include
an explicit variance for punishment—fines but no imprisonment,
and no felony conviction. At the same time, violating the gunless
certification would usually be undetectable, with the exception of
a person who was subject to a law enforcement search for an
unrelated reason. For situations such as those, it would be an
advantage for the statute to include language that allows the law
enforcement agency to have jurisdiction to enforce the
individual’s registration and seize the discovered firearms.

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x).
94 See Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1129, 1142–
50 (2014) (discussing the legislative transaction costs of amending existing code sections
versus creating new sections).
95 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK FACTS: FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_
Felon_in_Possession_of_a_Firearm.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4UF-2F2Q] (“The average sentence
length for offenders convicted of violating only section 922(g) but who were not sentenced under
ACCA was [forty-six] months.”).
92
93
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Registration would be a legally binding declaration and
commitment, and certified gunless individuals should be subject
to fines and firearm forfeiture, without compensation, if they later
decided to acquire a firearm in violation of their pledge. In
litigation, courts should be free to take judicial notice of the fact
that a party or witness is a certified registrant, if it is a relevant
fact in the case.96 In sum, in order for registration to be effectively
enforced, amending currently existing statutory language such as
§ 922 is a strong viable option, since it requires little legislative
action and the statute contains a preexisting penal scheme.
B.

No Registration of Gun Owners

One advantage of this proposal for voluntary registration
of those without firearms is that it helps fill in some of the
negative space around the field of gun ownership, which in turn,
mitigates these market failure problems and barriers to law
enforcement. For instance, the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act
of 198697 prohibits the federal government, or states, from
keeping any database or registry linking firearms to their
current owners.98 Nevertheless, a few states require private
sellers (licensed dealers that facilitate the private sales) to keep
some kind of records of the sales, but usually do not require
submission of records to authorities.99 Two jurisdictions, the
District of Columbia100 and Hawaii,101 require registration of all
firearms; New York requires registration of all handguns,102 and
California has a database of all firearm transfers.103 Five states
require registration of assault weapons and/or 50-calibre
96 This is another significant difference with some of the state legislative
versions of the Vars-ABA proposal. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.350(4) (“Neither a
voluntary waiver of firearm rights nor a revocation of a voluntary waiver of firearm
rights shall be considered by a court in any legal proceeding.”).
97 Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921).
98 Id. § 106(4).
99 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11105–06, 28100–28215; COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-12-112, -402, -403; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-31, -33(e), -37a(d), (f)(3); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1448B, tit. 24, §§ 904–904A; 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/3(b); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/24-4; MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-101, -120, -145; MD. CODE REGS.
29.03.01.09(D); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.422(5), .422a(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2b, 3h; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 898; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00(3), 400.00(12); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 6111(b)(1), (1.1), (1.4), (c), 6113(a)(5), (d); 37 PA. CODE § 33.111; R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-47-35(a)(2), -35.2(b); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2504.04(a)(3), (b). Washington requires
all firearm transfers to occur via a licensed dealer, so dealer recordkeeping requirements
include private sales. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.110(1)–(3),(9).
100 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-2502.01–.10; D.C. CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 24, §§ 2311–20.
101 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-3(a), (b), -4(b).
102 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00(22)(e)–(f), 400.00(10), (16-a), 400.02.
103 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11106(a)(1)–(b)(1), 28100, 28160.
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rifles.104 In addition, the National Firearms Act requires the
registration of machine guns, silencers, and short-barrel
shotguns,105 and the Gun Control Act of 1968 requires, as many
states also require, licensed firearms dealers to keep records of
all sales, and to provide records when federal law enforcement
agencies request them,106 as do many states.107
The NICS program can report how many background
checks occur every year, and the firearm manufacturing industry
certainly knows their annual sales volume; but these merely
suggest numbers of purchases in a given period, without
indicating who buys or ends up possessing the guns. The absence
of information about who owns guns potentially creates market
failures in the insurance and risk-management industries. By
clearly identifying individuals who are gunless, this proposal
would make more information available to the insurance and
risk-management industries, which in turn will be able to
perform more effectively.
III.

THE PROPOSAL: BENEFITS

The foregoing sections sketched out the details of the
proposal for voluntary registration and certification of those
eschewing firearms. This proposal would be a simple, yet
effective, way to move the gunless narrative forward. It would
also come with many benefits, including self-expression, social
identification, and the formalization of an important civic action
and personal moral commitment. Further, it could prove to be a
useful tool for market signaling, that is, providing information
that would elicit free market responses from commercial entities
and social institutions.

104 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 30900; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-202d(a); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-303; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-5(3)(f), :58-12(b); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 265.00(22)(e)–(f).
105 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). The National Firearm Act also includes, in a category
defined as “any other weapon,” certain smooth-bore handguns, but no other handguns.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(e).
106 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A); see also 27 C.F.R. § 478.129 (stating that such records
must be maintained for at least twenty years).
107 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 28100; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 28.422(5), .422a(2);
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 898; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(12); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-406; OR. REV.
STAT. § 166.412(2); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6111(b)–(c), 6113(a)(5), (d); 37 PA. CODE § 33.111.
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Social Identification and the Personal Disarmament
Movement

Political and social movements need markers and signals
of member identification and member identity to flourish.108
Naming and framing are essential features of social movements,
but a movement’s cohesiveness and recruitment also depend on
signs and symbols of membership, which are indicia of shared
values, goals, and commitment level.109 This is the “branding” of
the movement in a marketing sense, as it creates recognizable
distinctions between insiders and outsiders, and between “core
members” or radicals and tagalongs or the bandwagon crowd.110
Some researchers who study social movements refer to two
prongs, “identity,” and “agency,” that are essential to a social
movement’s success. These elements help groups to translate
their passion into action.111 These indicia can take the form of
symbols and slogans—more than mere social media hashtags—
as well as badges, cards, and other objects signifying one’s choice
to join. “Symbols matter because a person’s manifested attitude
toward symbols tells others something about that person’s
character. People rely heavily on this information when deciding
whether to engage in cooperative behavior in all realms of life.”112
Movements advocating for a prohibition or restriction, or
for a negative action, often build upon a forerunner movement of
abstinence, and abstinence movements depend heavily on
signifiers of commitment and membership.113 Anti-alcohol, antismoking, and anti-abortion movements have all been successful,
even though they involved advocacy for negative action that
limited individual choice.114 Regarding firearms, there is the
additional issue of a concrete object that people can possess (the
gun itself), which is a highly salient symbol to the owner for
creating a perceived sense of status or wealth, membership in a
social group,115 and an endowment effect (over-valued resistance
108 See Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947,
965 (1997) (discussing the importance of uniform signaling in social morality).
109 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 32 (“Collective efficacy comes when disenchanted
individuals, first, recognize themselves as a group with a shared grievance and, second,
believe that collective action can reduce or eradicate the source of that grievance.”).
110 See id. (surveying and synthesizing the literature on this subject).
111 See, e.g., id.
112 Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27
J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 766–67 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms].
113 See id. at 790 (describing effective commitment mechanisms by subcultures
such as desecrating the flag).
114 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 51–65.
115 See People of the Gun: A Tribe of Firearm Owners and Bloggers; Just Ordinary
Americans, Many of Them Your Friends and Neighbors, AMMO.COM, https://ammo.com/peopleof-the-gun [https://perma.cc/8QXZ-QYZ3].
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towards those who might want to confiscate the item once it is in
possession). It is also a highly salient symbol for others, most
significantly, to fellow owners. Their counterparts on the other
side of the policy divide have only a negative in that they lack an
item that others possess and prize. A certificate that recognizes
the person’s decision or commitment to renounce gun ownership
helps fill this psychical void—the object itself is a salient symbol
for the possessor of their membership in a group, provides a
perceived sense of status, and, I expect, even an endowment
effect; and it is certainly salient for others who have the same
certification. As Kristin Goss observes, movement leaders, whom
she calls issue entrepreneurs, must find ways to individualize the
collective goods or social reforms the group seeks.116
Social groups and movements need commitment signifiers
to build solidarity. As Posner observed, “‘[s]olidarity’ denotes the
ability of people to cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions.”117
Social movements and groups cannot survive without
mechanisms in place to build and maintain solidarity and to solve
coordination problems such as defection or abandonment of the
cause, free riding on the efforts of others, and so on.118 An up-front
costly commitment or investment is one example of an effective
mechanism.119 Some social movements and groups, like unions,
can create collective goods for the members, so it is in the state’s
interest to have rules that help build and preserve solidarity in
such groups.120 Suppose the government decides that gun
prevalence involves enormous externalities—the hundreds of
thousands of guns stolen per year that resupply the illicit firearm
traffickers, as well as accidental discharges, bad aim, escalation
of violence;121 simple rules that enable some citizens to desist from
gun ownership and encourage others to make a similar
commitment would be in the state’s interest, and would merely
require incremental policy steps.122
Regarding the necessary components for successful social
movements,
consider
the
early
twentieth
century
See GOSS, supra note 6, at 108.
Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 135 (1996).
118 See id. at 137–41.
119 See id. at 140.
120 See id. at 193 (“Solidary groups supply collective goods that people otherwise
demand from the state. Through policies of selective support, the state can effect increases
in the supply of these goods more cheaply than it could supply them itself through direct
or category-based regulation.”).
121 See FIRMIN DEBRABANDER, DO GUNS MAKE US FREE?: DEMOCRACY AND THE
ARMED SOCIETY 186 (2015).
122 For a discussion of the incrementalistic approach in advocacy movements, see
GOSS, supra note 6, at 65–67.
116
117
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temperance/prohibition movement and the word “teetotaler.”123
As a movement, it was spectacularly effective,124 even if the
resulting policy experiment failed. A movement to ban
something that was, at the time, popular and enjoyable won over
enough support to get a two-thirds supermajority in both houses
of Congress, in addition to ratification by three-fourths of the
state legislatures. This is where the words, the vows, and
membership identity come into play. The word “teetotaler”
entered the English language around 1830 to refer to those who
abstain completely, as a matter of conscience, from alcohol.125 Of
course, there have always been individuals who did not drink
alcohol—whether for religious, health, or financial reasons—but
there was no single word, title, or label for this. The word
“temperance,” for most of its history, meant “moderation” or selfcontrol, not a radical commitment to complete, permanent
abstinence.126 The prevailing theory among linguists and
etymologists seems to be that “teetotaler” comes either from an
emphatic duplication of the first syllable of “total”—a person
who abstained totally from alcohol due to a formal, permanent
vow was “totally, totally” committed, hence, “t-totally”127—or
that the “t” was an abbreviation for “temperate,” so a “t-totaler”
was “totally temperate.”128 A teetotaler, therefore, was stricter,
more conscientious, and more committed than someone who
incidentally did not drink alcohol, due to temporary scarcity or
unavailability of beverages or money to buy them.
The temperance movement, before it became the
prohibition movement, was the teetotaler movement, a
grassroots movement that organized local chapters in cities,
towns, and villages across the states and territories.129
123 See id. at 62–72 (describing the history and reasons for success of the
Prohibition Movement).
124 See id. at 62–65 (detailing the framing of issues in the Prohibition
Movement); R. Shep Melnick, The Federal Safeguards of Politics, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
847, 859 (2005) (describing the political effectiveness of organizing local chapters).
125 See Teetotal, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://www.etymonline.com/
word/teetotal [https://perma.cc/E2KC-6KEM].
126 See Harry G. Levine, Temperance Cultures: Alcohol as a Problem in Nordic and
English-Speaking Cultures, in THE NATURE OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG-RELATED PROBLEMS 9–
11 (Malcom Lader et al. eds., 1993).
127 See GEORGE CRUIKSHANK, THE GLASS AND THE NEW CRYSTAL PALACE 4
(1853) (nineteenth century tract-book advocating temperance).
128 See
Teetotalism,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teetotalism
[https://perma.cc/VZ8T-8YN3] (describing the dispute about the origin of the term); see also
Teetotal, supra note 125.
129 See Dalton Windham, “The White Ribbon Army”: Politics and Race Relations of the
Georgia Woman’s Christian Temperance Union from 1880 to 1907, 24 J. S. LEGAL HIST. 151,
155–63 (2016) (describing the emergence, local organization, and growth of the temperance
movement in Georgia); WILLIAM H. CHILD, AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND MEMOIRS 49–50 (CreateSpace
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Membership in these chapters required taking a public, solemn
oath to abstain forever from alcohol—at the movement’s peak, at
least one in ten Americans had signed the pledge.130 The groups
were close-knit and afforded a sense of community, friendship, or
intimacy, and they also provided accountability.131 Violators of
the vow were subject to expulsion and shunning.132 Membership
was appealing to outsiders, because the members had a closeknit community organized around a deep commitment to a
common cause, an obvious air of moral superiority,133 and a name.
Socially, the word “teetotaler” made teetotaling a “thing,” which
was the basis of the movement. The vows, which local chapters
enforced through social pressure and expulsion, built a
grassroots base of deeply and publicly committed members.134 As
Kristin Goss explains, “[w]hat made the movements possible was
political entrepreneurs who were able to frame private behavior
as a public problem in terms that were consonant with widely
shared values and capable of mobilizing well-organized
groups.”135 Decades later, as the temperance movement morphed
into the prohibition movement, membership became a litmus test
for church members, institutional leadership, and—in the end—
for political candidates.136
The modern gun rights movement has been highly
effective—much more so than the opposing side—in part due to its
focus on grassroots, local organization and membership
identification.137 National Rifle Association (NRA) members pay
Independent Publishing Platform 2015) (1917) (describing the formation of a local chapter of the
Sons of Temperance, a quasi-secret society, in Cornish, New Hampshire in 1866).
130 See Jason Mazzone, The Creation of a Constitutional Culture, 40 TULSA L. REV.
671, 681–83 (2005) (describing the signed pledge as an important tool); CHILD, supra note 129.
131 See Mazzone, supra note 130; see also Erin M. Masson, The Woman’s
Christian Temperance Union, 1874–1898: Combatting Domestic Violence, 3 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 163, 182 (1997) (describing the organization and achievements of the
temperance movement and the “circle of intimate acquaintances”).
132 See Sascha Auerbach, “Beyond the Pale of Mercy”: Victorian Penal Culture,
Police Court Missionaries, and the Origins of Probation in England, 33 LAW & HIST. REV.
621, 632–33 (2015) (describing pledge enforcement at the time).
133 See Bosworth v. Mass. Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 11 N.E.2d 916,
916–17 (Mass. 1937) (describing a local chapter of the temperance union, which received
share of testator’s estate).
134 See Mazzone, supra note 130, at 681; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Second Great
Awakening: A Christian Nation?, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1321–22 (2010) (describing the
rapid growth of the temperance unions and the pledge system).
135 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 63.
136 See generally id. at 62–64 (describing the prohibition movement’s origins in
the temperance movement and the pathway to political success).
137 See id. at 90 (describing NRA ground game); see also Jennifer Carlson, Gun Studies
and the Politics of Evidence, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 183, 193–95 (2020) (describing the
NRA’s framing and benefits offered to its constituents through membership and participation in
activities); Stacie J. Osborn, Preventing Intimate Partner Homicide: A Call for Cooperative
Federalism for Common Sense Gun Safety Policies, 66 LOY. L. REV. 235, 254–55 (2020)
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dues, have rallies, support legislative initiatives, and receive
training courses on firearm usage.138 They have clothing accessories
emblazoned with logos and slogans, bumper stickers, membership
cards, and a state-of-the-art website.139 There are a variety of
shorthand names with which they can identify themselves—”I’m the
N-R-A,” “2A advocates,” and so on.
The other side in this kulturkampf has not fared so well. As
explained by Kristin Goss in her insightful book Disarmed: The
Missing Movement for Gun Control in America, the “gun control”
movement never really got off the ground in the 1960s and 1970s,
or in the decades thereafter, because it lacked effective grassroots
organization, recruitment, or effective framing—the exact opposite
of the pro-gun movement during the same period.140 After the
public shock over the school massacres in Newtown and Parkland,
the movement has been trying, with some success, to reinvent itself
as the more reasonable-sounding “gun safety” movement or as a
public health movement.141 One can sign up for newsletters,
donate, and participate in occasional marches or protests; but even
the local chapters of “Everytown” do not function like local NRA
chapters, and much less like the close-knit, active communities
found in the local chapters of the Sons and Daughters of
Temperance in a previous era, which had weekly meetings in small
groups for accountability, support, and fellowship.142
How does one become a member of the anti-gun movement?
Enabling Americans to identify themselves as officially gunless
would help create social identification markers for the anti-gun
movement, something missing up to now; formal signals and labels
of identification with a movement are necessary for a movement’s

(describing NRA lobbying and grassroots efforts); David B. Kopel, The Great Gun Control War
of the Twentieth Century—And Its Lessons for Gun Laws Today, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1527,
1552–57 (2012) (describing the grassroots development of the NRA); Kristin A. Goss, Policy,
Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 681, 703–08 (2004) (describing the NRA’s growth strategy and development).
138 See What Is the NRA?, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://membership.nra.org/FAQ
[https://perma.cc/DT5H-KKMC].
139 See NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N, https://home.nra.org/ [https://perma.cc/KQD3-49US].
140 See Goss, supra note 6, at 190–94.
141 For an updated perspective on the movement, and its growth since the Sandy Hook
and Parkland massacres, see Kristin A. Goss, Whatever Happened to the ‘Missing Movement’?
Gun Control Politics Over Two Decades of Change, in GUN STUDIES: INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES TO POLITICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 136–49 (Jennifer Carlson et al. eds., 2018).
142 See id.; see also Aimee Huff & Michelle Barnhart, How a ‘Missing’ Movement Made
Gun Control a Winning Issue, CONVERSATION (Apr. 10, 2019, 6:49 AM), theconversation.c
om/how-a-missing-movement-made-gun-control-a-winning-issue-113301[https://perma.cc/5Z
HF-99GW]; Kristin Goss, Gun Laws Are Being Reformed, Just Not on Capitol Hill,
CONVERSATION (Dec. 10, 2015, 6:19 AM), https://theconversation.com/gun-laws-are-beingreformed-just-not-on-capitol-hill-51850?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Latest
[https://perma.cc/SY6N-WMZE].
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success.143 A system that allows individuals to make a legally
binding vow of personal disarmament, with certification, could
change the course of the movement. Also missing from the gun
control movement has been any call for personal abstinence from
gun ownership, or a personal pledge or commitment of self-denial in
this regard. On the contrary, the modern trend is for spokespersons
in the gun control movement to declare their appreciation for
responsible, safe, law-abiding gun owners.144 Some advocates for gun
control, in fact, tout their own gun ownership to establish credibility
with other gun owners and undecided prospective constituents—
such as Gabby Giffords,145 whose efforts and advocacy organizations
have made impressive positive achievements. The Parkland
Pledge,146 created by student activists following a recent school
massacre, strangely omits a pledge to abstain from gun ownership.
This approach is legitimate and has certainly been effective, but
there is also a place—a need—for those who want to change social
norms and values about guns, in addition to treating gun ownership
as a public health or violence prevention issue. Influencing public
morality starts with some individuals treating the issue as a matter
of personal morality; the time has come for some advocates to
renounce personal gun ownership openly, and to do so for
themselves before they ask or encourage others to do the same.
Movements need at least some exemplary icons, those who openly
manifest a radical personal commitment147—those whom Posner
calls “norm entrepreneurs,” who initiate the signals of commitment
to foster cooperation efforts.148 A social signal must be costly to be
effective at identifying a true believer.149
The anti-slavery movement provides another illustration.
Two generations before the abolitionist movement gained
traction, there was an individualized anti-slavery movement,
famously described in the colonial-era journal of John
143 See MATTHEW A. PEEPLES, CONNECTED COMMUNITIES: NETWORKS, IDENTITY, AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE ANCIENT CIBOLA WORLD 27 (2018) (“[C]ategorical identities are usually
named social entities, often with specific material markers of membership or participation.”).
144 See, e.g., IGOR VOLSKY, GUNS DOWN: HOW TO DEFEAT THE NRA AND BUILD A SAFER
FUTURE WITH FEWER GUNS 141–45 (2019); see also GUN OWNERS FOR RESPONSIBLE
OWNERSHIP, https://www.responsibleownership.org [https://perma.cc/2YQQ-MDJ9].
145 See Maggie Astor, Why Gabby Giffords Is Starting a Gun Control Group for Gun
Owners, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/politics/gabbygiffords-minnesota-guns.html [https://perma.cc/5QSS-S4W9] (“Ms. Giffords and her husband,
Mark Kelly, who is running for Senate in Arizona, own guns themselves and argue that gun
ownership can coexist with significantly stricter gun laws.”).
146 See The Parkland Pledge, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/sign-theparkland-pledge-today [https://perma.cc/MQD8-FNZK].
147 See Ari Decter-Frain et al., Why and How Groups Create Moral Heroes, in
HANDBOOK OF HEROISM AND HEROIC LEADERSHIP 122–23 (Scott T. Allison et al. eds., 2016).
148 See Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms, supra note 112, at 773.
149 See id. at 768.
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Woolman.150 Woolman was a Quaker who realized that slave
ownership was a vice.151 Over a period of several years, Woolman
played a major role in convincing other Quakers in the American
colonies to free their slaves.152 Similarly, the temperance and antismoking movements were built on an underlying premise that
supporters would personally refrain from indulging in the
respective vice—to quit drinking or quit smoking. A demarcated
personal commitment of abstinence is necessary to give moral
credibility to a reform movement, and to occasion the grassroots
recruitment by way of “take the pledge” drives.153 Pledges of
abstinence or oaths of renunciation also alter the balance of each
individual’s calculus in advocating for new laws—a person who
already thinks of herself as someone who will never own a gun
will feel no loss when restrictions on gun ownership, sales, or use
become law. A system that allows individuals to receive
certification for renouncing gun ownership may be essential to
galvanize, and build, a different type of anti-gun movement—one
that is truly anti-gun, versus a movement that favors various
types of moderate regulations. As CNN writer John Blake has
noted, “Some have suggested that the NRA will lose power if guns
are reframed as something uncool, like cigarettes.”154
Legal mechanisms can shift the meaning of certain
activities so that social norms change as well.155 Changing the
social meaning of gun ownership could eventually produce a
shift in the choices people make and how they view and treat
others.156 Other commentators have used the example of
motorcycle helmets: if legal rules, or even legal nudges, were to
change the meaning of riding without a helmet from a carefree
act of enjoyment into a recklessly risky activity, then social
150 See generally JOHN WOOLMAN, THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WOOLMAN (first publ. 1774)
(republished online by CCEL), http://www.ccel.org/w/woolman/journal/cache/journal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7WZ-AWVB].
151 See id. at 8–10.
152 See id. at 14–17; see also BROCK, supra note 28, at 52 (“Woolman was one of
those most responsible for bringing about the abolition of slaveholding among Friends
and for launching the Society on its antislavery career.”).
153 One of the most successful tools used by the temperance movement required
people to sign pledges. See Holland Webb, Temperance Movements and Prohibition, 74
INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 61, 66 (1999) (“Whereas, the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage
is productive of pauperism, degradation and crime; and believing it our duty to
discourage that which produces more evil than good, we therefore pledge ourselves to
abstain from the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage.” (internal citation omitted)).
154 John Blake, This Is How the NRA Loses, CNN (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.c
nn.com/2015/10/15/politics/defy-gun-lobby/index.html [https://perma.cc/7YPR-HBUZ].
155 See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 35, 41–42 (2002).
156 See id. at 41 (“Changing social meaning will have an effect on the acts that
members of society sanction and may also affect whether a preference for or against the
regulated behavior becomes internalized and therefore subject to third order sanctions.”).

208

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

norms would disapprove of riding without a helmet.157 In fact,
many individuals often internalize such a change in meaning so
that it becomes part of their own value system, and they would
feel silly, or even a little guilty, for riding without a helmet.158 A
legal mechanism, therefore, that enabled individuals to declare
and certify themselves as gunless can change how the rest of
society views and responds to gun ownership and gun
abstinence, and could even shift the values people internalize for
themselves about the need or the virtue of owning a gun. In other
words, it would be easier for individuals to see how gun
ownership, even for self-defense, could be a vice.159
One anticipated objection to my proposal is that it could
indirectly stigmatize gun ownership by legitimizing, and then
popularizing, personal disarmament. Yet there is nothing
unconstitutional about cultivating social norms and values that
indirectly generate collective approbation for firearms. Just as
NRA support has long been a litmus test for Republican politicians,
a gunless certification could become a badge of honor for
progressives or even moderate candidates. During the prohibition
movement, the teetotaler designation was a useful screening
mechanism for single-issue voters, who in turn were instrumental
in achieving unlikely political success. Popular celebrities could
lend verve to the movement by registering and flaunting their
certification. Gunlessness could become a status symbol in the
same way that assault weapons are in pro-gun circles today. Social
norms can have more effect on behavior than legal rights. In any
case, the certification proposal would create a type of personal
“political opportunity,” as scholars of mass movements call it.160
The ability to signal deeply held behavioral commitments
through official declarations also lowers information costs for
legislators, enforcers, and adjudicators.161 Legislators and
See id.
See id.
159 See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 7, at 344–49.
160 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 186.
161 See, e.g., Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the
Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 57 (2006) (discussing signaling between voters
and laterally between lawmakers); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1771–72 (2007) (describing a popular theory
in political science about the signaling functions of the citizenry to Congress through
regulatory agencies); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and
Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 132–34 (2012)
(discussing information availability and signaling of preferences by the citizenry); Amanda
Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 966 (2012) (discussing interbranch preference
signaling and imperfect information); Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics
of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 538–39 (1998)
(discussing signaling between tax beneficiaries and lawmakers); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the
Executive (By Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 820–22 (2012) (discussing voter
157
158
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regulators glean useful information about voter constituents’
values, as well as a picture of exceptional subgroups (outliers)
within a regulated community.162 Researchers call this
“preference signaling,” that is, the idea of “sending reliable
information to elected officials about public demands.”163
Analogously, law enforcement officers and prosecutors would
have additional information to avoid mistakes with over- and
under-enforcement of the rules, or at least to reduce Type I
errors in arrests and prosecutions. Adjudicators can streamline
certain factual or evidentiary determinations when otherwise
contested points are already a matter of public record. Those
who believe that their group affiliation or race makes them more
vulnerable to wrongful accusations or even wrongful convictions
may welcome signaling devices that reduce the likelihood that
law enforcement would incorrectly implicate them in a crime.
B.

Self-Signaling and Identity: Formalizing Our Personal
Commitments

Formalizing our personal moral commitments with
ceremonies and oaths is a practice across cultures and serves an
important subjective psychological purpose. It strengthens our
resolve and becomes part of our sense of self; it turns a choice
into part of our identity, our subjective persona.164 Commitment
formalities are uniquely expressive and a way that society
allows us to declare our deeply held convictions and
commitments, thereby reinforcing those inner values. While the
foregoing section focused on social signaling to build social group
solidarity and contribute to the development of social norms, this
section addresses self-signaling, the importance of special
signaling and information costs for legislators and judges); Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation
Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 418 (2013)
(discussing subtle signaling to the courts by the executive branch); Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 419 (2000) (discussing signaling effects and information costs for voters and
government officials); James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game
of Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84, 97–98 (2001) (interbranch policy
preference signaling); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look”
Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 766–83 (2006) (discussing information costs for courts
and regulatory signaling); McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 7, at 361–62
(discussing signaling between the citizenry and the legislature).
162 See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 7, at 360–62; see also Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV.
1809, 1826–30 (2017) (discussing the importance of incorporating citizens’ willingness-to-pay
for moral commitments as a necessary component of regulatory cost-benefit analysis).
163 See GOSS, supra note 6, at 187 (emphasis omitted).
164 See Roger Brownsword, Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins,
and Technological Management, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1321, 1356 (2011) (discussing
“[i]n-person moral coding”).
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actions for developing our internal norms, drive, and selfnarrative. Commitment devices—aids to self-control—have
received serious academic attention in recent years. For
example, in his book Carrots and Sticks, Ian Ayres describes in
detail the value of sanctioned pledges and commitment contracts
in achieving personal goals when we otherwise lack selfcontrol.165 One benefit of registration and certification for
personal disarmament is just that—pledges with sanctions can
be very effective commitment devices, helping individuals
exercise self-control over time, even when the pledge itself is
entirely voluntary. The Vars proposal (using self-registration
with NICS to prevent gun suicide) builds nicely on this body of
scholarly work regarding such commitment devices.166
Yet there is something here besides bolstering self-control,
as valuable as that goal may be.167 Two other new lines of
scholarship have emerged in the last two decades about the
interplay between decisions and internal character development,
how a person’s sense of identity influences their behaviors, and how
their behaviors in turn reshape their sense of identity. In economics,
an influential article by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton,168
published in 2000, helped launch a line of academic inquiry about
the sense of identity as a type of utility or source of value that factors
into behavioral decisions alongside external incentives,169
165 See IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 3–7 (2010); see also IAN AYRES,
OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 1–9 (2005) (incorporating the
insights of options theory into our legal rules). See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
(2009) (arguing for opt-in and opt-out rules that maximize individuals’ welfare and help
them avoid framing mistakes).
166 See sources cited supra note 4.
167 Of course, the individuals who seek certification as “gunless” already do not
own guns, do not want to own guns, and they are less likely to lapse from this
commitment due to a sudden impulse or simple lack of self-control.
168 See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115
Q.J. ECON. 715, 718–27 (2000).
169 See, e.g., Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Economics, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 43, 59–60 (2011) (describing the Akerlof-Kranton idea and observing, “[i]t is hard to
overstate the implications of this approach in important areas of legal analysis”); George A.
Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP.
9, 10–11 (2005); Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 1179, 1206 (2010) (describing identity-based brand management as an effective
internal branding program, which imbues work-related behaviors with special emotional
significance); Rafael Gely, The Law and Economics of Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
229, 230 (2007) (applying the Akerlof-Kranton model to gender identity and its legal
ramifications); Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389, 435–
39 (2007) (extending the Akerlof-Kranton ideas to other areas of law); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1320 (2003) (“[The Akerlof-Kranton model] puts forth
a theory for why individuals act against their own interests in order to preserve or augment
their group identity. Flouting the perceived ideals of the group generates personal anxiety
over self-image.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1597
(2018) (“This authentic narrative of firm purpose and identity could prove incredibly powerful
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sometimes inducing individuals to do things that appear to
outsiders to be contrary to their self-interest. Akerlof and Kranton
offer as examples self-mutilation (tattoos or piercings), genderselection in careers, alumni giving, and mountaineering.170 A
parallel line of scholarship in the field of psychology and cognitive
science has focused on “self-signaling” as an aspect of moral
development over time171 and as a motivation or incentive for
making individual choices.172 Both of these lines of newer research
show that formal legal actions, like various sorts of registrations
with a government agency such as legal declarations, filing claims
in court, and legally-binding commitments, are important selfsignaling devices, adding to or detracting from our sense of moral
character or social identity. One of the most recent articles explains,
“[r]ecent research suggests people are particularly motivated to
engage in self-signaling behaviors when they perceive their actions
as ‘self-diagnostic’ (i.e., representative of the type of person they
are).”173 Individuals who conscientiously or scrupulously object to
personal gun ownership would derive subjective utility from being
able to make an official legal declaration to this effect,174 especially
in motivating employees to be more productive, customers to be more loyal, and investors to
be more patient with the company.”); Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives Displace
Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks to Confront the Challenge of
Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 245–47 (2016) (discussing the tension
between commitment devices and preexisting internal drivers).
170 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 168, at 721–23.
171 Although this field may be less familiar to legal commentators than economics,
the two main seminal works in this line of scholarship appear to be Ronit Bodner & Drazen
Prelec, Self-Signaling and Diagnostic Utility in Everyday Decision Making, in 1 THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 105 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003),
and Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 489 (2003). Like the Akerlof-Kranton article in economics, these two teams of
researchers triggered a line of fruitful scholarship in this area, expanding and extending
the original ideas. See, e.g., Roland Bénabou et al., Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral
Reasoning (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24798, 2018); Roland
Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets, 126 Q.J. ECON. 805
(2011) [hereinafter Bénabou & Tirole, Identity, Morals and Taboos]; Maferima TouréTillery & Alysson E. Light, No Self to Spare: How the Cognitive Structure of the Self
Influences Moral Behavior, 147 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 48 (2018).
172 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre Dubé et al., Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: A Cause
Marketing Mobile Field Experiment 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
21475, 2015) (providing empirical evidence that “supports the self-signaling theory whereby
price discounts crowd out a consumer’s self-inference of altruism from buying a good bundled
with a charitable donation”); Olivia Johnson & Veena Chattaraman, Conceptualization and
Measurement of Millennial’s Social Signaling and Self-Signaling for Socially Responsible
Consumption, 18 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 32, 34–35 (2019); Chang-Yuan Lee et al., Past Actions
as Self-Signals: How Acting in a Self-Interested Way Influences Environmental Decision Making,
11 PLOS ONE 4–8 (2016) (showing how self-signaling from past choices and commitments
shapes future decision making); Katie Baca-Motes et al., Commitment and Behavior Change:
Evidence from the Field, 39 J. CONSUMER RES, 1070, 1071 (2013) (examining the effect of hotel
guests’ symbolic commitment to practice environmentally friendly behavior during their stay).
173 See Touré-Tillery & Light, supra note 171.
174 See Hill, supra note 169, at 406–11 (explaining “identity payoff[s]”).
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if there were some cost or consequence attached.175 Giving these
individuals an increased sense of subjective utility produces an
increase in social welfare that is Pareto-superior, as it does not
harm anyone else. Many of us in the nonviolent community would
find this tremendously satisfying and subjectively beneficial. As one
recent commentator put it, “[p]eople draw conclusions about their
own motives based on their actions . . . . more salient incentives
may be more likely to influence self-signaling.”176 At the same time,
this act of registration and certification would predictably
strengthen the resolve of these individuals on this and related
issues, according to both economics and cognitive science research,
as the self-signaling effect informs the future sense of identity or
internal moral narrative; the commitment itself makes the issue
more important to the person.177
In this sense, registration and certification would be what
I would call a commitment intensifier. We often infer our own
current preferences from our own past actions and behaviors.178
Researchers describe a self-signaling phenomenon of “escalating
commitments,” where people continue to invest in an aspect of
their identity, such as family, neighborhood, or career, where they
have already achieved illustrious results, even beyond the point
of positive marginal returns.179 When we solemnize a
commitment, or make it official in the legal sense, we are more
likely to continue to build on that commitment and intensify it in
the future. To the extent that the commitment itself is socially
useful (and most agree that reduced gun prevalence is),180 a legal
device that functions as a commitment intensifier would be
175 Unsurprisingly, costly commitments are stronger self-signaling devices. See
Baca-Motes et al., supra note 172, at 1079 (“[W]hen an initial prosocial act is costly to the
individual, it serves as a signal to the self that she is a prosocial person, which in turn
increases the likelihood that she will behave in ways consistent with that self-image.”).
176 See Underhill, supra note 169, at 245.
177 See DAN ARIELY, THE HONEST TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY: HOW WE LIE TO
EVERYONE—ESPECIALLY OURSELVES 122–23 (2013) (explaining self-signaling and applying
it to examples of personal morality).
178 See Lee et al., supra note 172, at 2; Bénabou & Tirole, Identity, Morals and
Taboos, supra note 171, at 810 (“When a person has been induced to behave prosocially
or selfishly, or just provided with signals presumed to be informative about his morality,
his choices in subsequent, unrelated interactions are significantly affected.”).
179 See Bénabou & Tirole, Identity, Morals and Taboos, supra note 171, at 838–39.
180 See
Guns, GALLUP NEWS, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8JDB-YUMD] (showing through various poll questions that most Americans
want stricter gun laws, though not a complete handgun ban); see also Guns, POLLING REP.,
https://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm [https://perma.cc/H7WH-NGAR] (similar results);
Margaret Talbot, The 2020 Democrats and the New Politics of Gun Violence, NEW YORKER (Dec.
8, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/16/the-2020-democrats-and-the-newpolitics-of-gun-violence [https://perma.cc/4LWK-RFRK]; Rachel Treisman, Poll: Number of
Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Continues to Grow, NPR (Oct. 20, 2019, 7:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/10/20/771278167/poll-number-of-americans-who-favor-stricter-gunlaws-continues-to-grow [https://perma.cc/8V8C-55Q4].
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socially beneficial. “Indeed, from a society’s perspective, if people
have socially desirable identities (such as being a ‘good citizen’),
getting them to behave desirably is cheap; the question then
becomes how to get people to adopt those identities.”181
At the same time, formalities also serve an ex ante
purpose, highlighting for ourselves the gravity of the commitment
we are about to make.182 The legal formalities, warnings, and
declarations involved in registration and certification would aid
in isolating and solemnizing this choice; it would force the
individual to deliberate about and reflect more deeply upon the
reasons for doing it. In this sense, I would call registration and
certification a salience intensifier, and this is in line with
numerous salience intensifiers (solemn, vivid warnings and
disclosures) in our legal system when individuals are waiving
rights or incurring liabilities.
Solemn declarations—actual vows, not mere promises—
help shape the way we think about ourselves and the world, our
sense of personal dignity, and what we expect others to expect of
us, especially those closest to us.183 Pragmatically, registration
and certification as gunless changes the registrant, from
someone who is casually—or incidentally—not presently a gun
owner, into a person who has officially and personally
repudiated guns and gun violence. Such formalized and publicly
witnessed decisions are integrated into our sense of identity and
reprioritize our internal values and preferences—we see
ourselves differently, and we subjectively identify with others
who make a similar commitment to nonviolence.184
C.

Market Signaling and Market Responses

The question of whether owning a gun makes one safer
or less safe is a point of intense disagreement in academia, and
the arguments are well-rehearsed. Even apart from problems of
bias or partisanship, however, there is a chronic information
deficit: nobody knows for certain exactly how many guns are in
See Hill, supra note 169, at 395.
See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 272 (2011) (“[L]egalization may describe one element helping to
underscore the degree of seriousness and solemnity with which a party undertakes a
commitment . . . .”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018) (“Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the
decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might
later occur in the absence of a writing.”).
183 See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 168, at 727–32 (theoretical modeling of
the mechanism).
184 See Hill, supra note 169, at 439–42 (discussing how law shapes identities and
evaluating this from a cost-benefit perspective).
181
182
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circulation, exactly how many people own guns, how often guns
are used in legitimate self-defense or prevention of crime, or
even what the crime rates are for every locale due to
underreporting problems.185 Nevertheless, one sector of our
society can transcend the bias problem, and potentially part of
the data deficiency problem, due to a strong, direct financial
interest in accurately answering questions of risk: private
insurers. Insurers have a direct profit incentive to conduct their
own sophisticated actuarial and statistical research to identify
predictors—on a granular level—for having to pay out claims.186
Insurers providing liability coverage for homeowners or
businesses—and health or life insurance for individuals—invest
heavily in determining risk factors so that they can price their
policies accordingly.187 These firms can determine whether gun
ownership makes a person a better or worse risk from an
insurer’s standpoint, although traditionally insurers have not
asked prospective policyholders about gun ownership and most
claim they have not tracked claims in this regard.188 Their profit
incentives offset any political considerations about controversial
issues like guns.189 An insurance firm’s legal duty is to maximize
profit for their shareholders, not to venerate the Second
Amendment. Accurately assessing risks is necessary for pricing
policies within the margin of profitability, given the likelihood
and scope of payouts or claims on the policy.190
Suppose that insurers could reliably identify either gun
owners or nonowners, whether through the individuals’ selfdisclosures or through statistical correlations that serve as
accurate predictors. The firms would have a market incentive to
adjust pricing of policies based on this predictor, along with all the
others predictors they consider. As one commentator put it, “[b]y
analyzing greater amounts of data, insurers will be able to more
185 See RAND CORP., THE SCIENCE OF GUN POLICY: A CRITICAL SYNTHESIS OF
RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTS OF GUN POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 275–79 (2018)
(summarizing a comprehensive meta-study of all extant research on defensive gun use and
explaining the elusive problems with measurement, including underreporting); see also
Richard T. Boylan, Imputation Methods Make Crime Studies Suspect: Detecting Biases via
Regression Discontinuity (Jan. 2, 2019) (pre-publication manuscript on file with author).
186 See Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 46 (2018) (describing insurer investments in such data before the Affordable Care Act).
187 See id.
188 See Morgan Sherburne, Insurance Companies Don’t Ask About Gun
Ownership, U-M Researcher Asks Why, MICH. NEWS (July 2, 2018), https://news.um
ich.edu/insurance-companies-dont-ask-about-gun-ownership-u-m-researcher-asks-why/
[https://perma.cc/DW5N-CR7W].
189 See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
311, 316–17 (1997) (describing competition between insurers for superior risk pricing).
190 See Jean Lemaire, The Cost of Firearm Deaths in the United States: Reduced
Life Expectancies and Increased Insurance Costs, 72 J. RISK & INS. 359, 369–71 (2005).
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accurately tailor the pricing of their policies, which would increase
actuarial fairness, address several longstanding problems related
to consumer incentives, and aid insurers’ efforts to prevent losses
from occurring.”191 If gun ownership predicted an increase in
payouts on claims, whether in terms of frequency or sums,
eventually nonowners would receive discounted premiums. Of
course, if the pro-gun advocates are correct, the financial
incentives will run in the opposite direction—and in that case,
insurers should already be offering price incentives for gun
ownership. The latter possibility seems less likely, given that
insurers who cover public schools threaten to drop their coverage
when the schools announce plans to arm the teachers,192 a realworld natural experiment that informs the discussion here. This
insurer is not engaging in corporate social activism, discussed
below, or ideology-based discrimination;193 instead, this is
actuarial risk assessment and risk-based pricing, just as when
insurers ask new applicants about their age, education, profession,
and participation in risky extracurricular activities like skydiving
or heavy drinking.194 When it comes to guns, the advocates on each
side cite widely disparate research as to the risks or lack thereof
of gun ownership. Insurers may be the only player in this arena
with a direct financial incentive to discover the objective truth.195
Accurate insurance pricing therefore benefits society as a whole by
making affordable insurance more widely available.196
Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U.
L. REV. 859, 876 (2016).
192 See Rebekah Elliott, The Real School Safety Debate: Why Legislative Responses
Should Focus on Schools and Not on Guns, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 523, 535 (2015) (describing an
incident where the liability insurer for most of Kansas’ school districts cautioned that
districts permitting employees to carry handguns would lose coverage); Danielle
Weatherby, Opening The “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers in the War Against School Violence
and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119, 172 (2015) (same); Laura
Houser Oblinger, Note, The Wild, Wild West of Higher Education: Keeping the Campus
Carry Decision in the University’s Holster, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 116 (2013) (“Some
providers covering school districts have already announced that they will drop, or at least
decrease, insurance coverage if administrators allow guns in schools.”).
193 See Victor Epstein, Kansas Law Thrusts Iowa Insurer into Gun Debate, USA
TODAY (July 7, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/07/kan-lawthrusts-iowa-insurer-into-gun-debate/2495815/ [https://perma.cc/9F45-2LRL] (“It’s not a
political decision, but a financial one based on the riskier climate it estimates would be
created, the insurer said.”).
194 See George L. Priest, A Principled Approach Toward Insurance Law: The
Economics of Insurance and the Current Restatement Project, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 635, 643–
44 (2017) (discussing the practice of segregating risks by risk level to reduce risk variance).
195 See Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules,
Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157, 214–15 (2003) (arguing that insurance
pricing is a fairer method for wealth redistribution than other policy tools).
196 See Priest, supra note 194, at 646 (“[I]t is well established that the more
precisely insurers can accurately segregate risks by insurance discrimination, the more
broadly insurance can be offered in the society.”)
191
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A fascinating 2018 article in The Actuary, the trade
journal for the national Society of Actuaries, explored the risks of
gun ownership from an actuarial-insurance perspective.197 The
authors conclude that (1) the death rate for firearms is material,
from an insurer’s perspective; (2) insurance underwriting usually
overlooks firearm ownership; and (3) the risks involved with gun
ownership are significantly larger than at least one factor (scuba
diving) that insurance underwriting routinely considers in pricing
policies.198 The article ends with an open call to action for
actuaries nationwide to begin tracking and evaluating the risks
of gun ownership for insureds:
Actuaries have unique skills in measuring and managing risk. We are
experts in mortality analysis, skilled in data analytics and model
building, and we can analyze the problem objectively. As a profession,
we must employ our skills and talents to help address the economic,
mortality and morbidity impact of gun violence.199

Insurers’ incentives normally pass through to their
customers, and this in turn shapes the behavior of the insured.200
In other words, not only would insurers have the opportunity
and incentive to reward nonownership if it were easy to verify
this negative, but the reward system would utilize market forces
to reduce gun prevalence in society.201 Of course, insurers would
not have to consider gun ownership in their individualized or
categorized risk assessments. Some may decline to do so for
ideological or public relations reasons, or because they think
that identifying some nonowners is still not enough information
for pricing, or because they think gun ownership is insignificant
compared to other risk factors. Even so, in a market where
multiple insurers compete with each other for profitability,
share price, and consumer market share, there is an incentive
for firms to utilize as much information as possible, to fine-tune
the accuracy of their risk assessments and policy pricing.202

197 See Kristen Moore & Craig Reynolds, Firearm Risk: An Insurance Perspective,
ACTUARY (June/July 2018), https://theactuarymagazine.org/firearm-risk/#enref-4634-24
[https://perma.cc/UY37-TJ2T].
198 See id.
199 Id.
200 See Bambauer & Zarsky, supra note 186, at 1 (“Algorithms attempt to estimate
some difficult-to-measure quality about a subject using proxies, and the subjects in turn change
their behavior in order to game the system and get a better treatment for themselves . . . . These
behavioral changes can then prompt the algorithm to make corrections.”).
201 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” For Everyone (And
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1699 (2006) (advocating “using reputation-tracking
technologies to displace criminal law enforcement and improve the tort system”).
202 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk
Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403, 403–05 (1985).

2020]

GOING GUNLESS

217

Some legislators and commentators have proposed a law
requiring liability insurance for gun owners.203 These proposals
have some merit, at least for unintentional injuries, but that is
not the argument here. Instead, the point here is that allowing
gunless individuals to self-register and obtain official certification
would provide useful, reliable information to insurers for risk
pricing that is already going on.204 In other words, gun ownership
may be a reliable predictor of current types of insurance claims
(i.e., injuries and property damage) that may result even
indirectly from gun ownership, such as injuries or damage from
others’ guns. Alternatively, it is possible that a policyholder files
a claim for injuries or property damage done by another, but that
harm became more likely once the policyholder had guns. My
proposal is that identifying nonowners (through registration and
government certification) would provide superior information to
the insurers compared to what they currently have available.
At present, insurers have no way to know which insureds
own guns, except for asking a few questions on policy applications
and trusting the answers provided. Many insurance applicants
are untruthful, of course, creating a lemons effect205 for insurers
(a cost they pass through to their customers). The type of official
certification described here would at least identify, with near
certainty, some of the negatives, that is, the nonowners. Reliable
information about even a portion of the insureds would be
helpful.206 Another part of the current information deficit facing
insurers is that there is little or no research done by the federal

203 See Rob Hillenbrand, Note, Heller on the Threshold: Crafting a Gun Insurance
Mandate, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1455–56 (2015) (arguing in favor of state experimentation
with such mandates); Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance & the Regulation
of Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). For academic
commentary arguing against such proposals, see, e.g., George A. Mocsary, Insuring Against
Guns?, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1212–13 (2014) (arguing against gun insurance proposals).
204 For an excellent and thorough survey of gun-related insurance occurrences
and claims, and state-by-state relevant legal rules impacting coverage, see Rina Carmel et
al., Caught in the Cross Fire: Impact of Coverage Issues, Defense Issues, and Firearm
Legislation for Gun Claims (ABA Insurance Coverage Litigation Committee CLE Seminar,
Mar. 7, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2411794 [https://perma.cc/FYY9-HGXS].
205 A “lemons effect” describes the way in which certain undesirable items in a
market (that is, counterfeits, unreliable or low-quality lookalikes, etc.), diminish the value of
all the comparable items in that market, including the high-quality ones, if consumers cannot
easily distinguish quality or counterfeits before purchase. See George Akerlof, The Market for
‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 495 (1970).
206 As George Priest put it many years ago, “Applied to insurance, the law of
large numbers means that as one increases the number of insured persons possessing
independent and identically-valued risks, one increases the accuracy of prediction of
expected loss for each individual.” George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1540 (1987).
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agencies that normally study and regulate health and safety.207
Firearms and ammunition are outside the purview of safety
testing or risk assessment that the Consumer Products Safety
Commission (CPSC) conducts (and publishes) for virtually every
other consumer item,208 for example. Insurers usually benefit from
such information, especially about products that cause tens of
thousands of deaths every year, whether for users, intended
victims, or unintended victims (innocent bystanders).209 Since the
1970s, federal law has prohibited the CPSC from conducting the
usual safety research about guns, such as whether a certain
model or brand is prone to accidental discharge or jamming.210 The
black box of unknowns surrounding the risks of firearm
ownership needs remediation, and that could take place through
market responses to the signaling of self-registration and
certification. Providing the private insurance industry with more
reliable information may prove more effective than some
government regulations would, at least in the area of firearm risk
management. Some commentators have argued that private
insurance often regulates risk better than regulatory agencies, as
insurers can require specific investments in risk reduction, offer
premium discounts, and so on.211
Even apart from risk assessment and insurance pricing,
market signals can also trigger ideological or “social action”
responses. For example, after the 2018 Parkland school massacre,
Dick’s Sporting Goods and Walmart stopped carrying certain
guns or ammunition, certain banks imposed restrictions on
207 See Olivia Li, Cars, Toys, and Aspirin Have to Meet Mandatory Safety
Standards. Guns Don’t. Here’s Why., TRACE (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org/
2016/01/gun-safety-standards/ [https://perma.cc/V4AP-KXD8].
208 See COOK & GOSS, supra note 23, at 123–24 (describing statutory exclusions
for guns from consumer product safety regulations).
209 See VOLKSY, supra note 144, at 125–26 (discussing the increasing problem
with this information deficit).
210 See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat.
503, 504 (“The Consumer Product Safety Commission shall make no ruling or order that
restricts the manufacture or sale of firearms, firearms ammunition, or components of firearms
ammunition, including black powder or gunpowder for firearms.”); see also COOK AND GOSS,
supra note 23, at 123–24; GOSS, supra note 6, at 78–79 (describing the legislative
maneuvering in the 1970s to ensure that there would be no federal safety specifications or
regulations for firearms or ammunition); VOLSKY, supra note 144, at 125–26.
211 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance
Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 197 (2012) (“Successful regulation of behavior
requires information in setting standards, licensing conduct, verifying outcomes, and
assessing remedies. In various areas, the private insurance sector has technological
advantages in collecting and administering the information relevant to setting standards and
could outperform the government in creating incentives for optimal behavior.”); id. at 247; see
also Jeffrey Kehne, Note, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial
Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 403 (1986) (arguing that the potential
benefits of insurance-based incentives in the arena of hazardous wastes would justify revision
of existing financial responsibility and liability standards).
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corporate clients regarding assault weapons or bump stocks,
mutual funds began offering index funds that avoid gun
companies, and some airlines and rental companies ended their
relationship with the NRA.212 Depending on one’s position on the
issue (or any issue that corporations champion), such
developments are either virtuous or vicious, but such corporate
activism has become an inescapable part of modern society, as
have similarly motivated consumer boycotts. It is also arguable
that the situation is not in fact new, given that before these
changes, the firms were cooperating with the firearms industry
and subsidizing the NRA—the position of the companies has
changed, but the involvement with socially controversial issues
has always been there.
In this environment, it is likely that there would be a
marketplace response to certification of gunless individuals—
discounts, rebates, promotions, and so on. Such a reaction is merely
an extension of the signaling-and-social-norms phenomenon
explained above, except that here, the response is from outside the
movement itself—the reaction of the larger society to a movement
that has coalesced to the point where its most ardent members are
easily identifiable. This is one of the goals of the self-registration
proposal: we must change the culture about guns, not just our laws.
D.

Reducing the Gun Supply Without Restricting It

A program of voluntary registration and certification for
those who want to be gunless could also help reduce the
aftermarket firearm supply without restricting the rights of
lawful firearm purchasers and owners. To the extent that gun
crime depends on the availability of guns themselves, reducing
the stock of guns in circulation would reduce, even if it did not
eliminate, the availability of guns for would-be criminals. A
persistent policy conundrum has been how to reduce the number
of guns in circulation without restricting the availability of guns
for those who want to exercise their Second Amendment rights.
Policies that seek to reduce gun violence by restricting sales of
guns, or even certain types of guns, run into this conundrum—
the laws inevitably impact nonviolent, law-abiding gun
enthusiasts at the same time, who may complain that the
restrictions infringe on their Second Amendment rights. The
same problem affects well-intentioned regulations about
transporting, storing, and using guns.

212

See Lin, supra note 169, at 1556–57.
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The proposal outlined in this article avoids this problem, but
still has the potential to reduce the number of guns in circulation
through voluntary relinquishment and abstinence from gun
purchases. Reducing the supply of firearms to the black market
without restricting the legal rights of lawful gun owners would be a
breakthrough in firearm policy. Suppose the movement-signaling
effects of the program convince more Americans to forsake gun
ownership, the self-signaling or commitment-enhancing effects
result in many nonowners remaining gunless for a longer term, and
the market-signaling effects make some individuals more inclined
to avoid gun ownership. These effects would reduce the number of
privately-owned guns overall, which would have the advantage of
shrinking the black market for crime guns.
Firearm manufacturers sell their products to federally
licensed firearm dealers, or to government entities such as law
enforcement and the military.213 Licensed firearm dealers, in
turn, sell guns (almost) exclusively to purchasers who pass a
NICS background check.214 Even at gun shows, the licensed
firearm dealers, who constitute most of the vendors there, must
conduct background checks for all purchases.215 The remaining
vendors are private individuals selling items from their own
collection or stockpile of guns.216 This means that every gun that
ends up being used in a crime,217 with the minor exception of
“ghost guns” (assembled entirely from parts by private
gunsmiths),218 originally entered the stream of commerce via a
legal sale to a lawful purchaser who passed a background check.

213 See Daniel W. Webster et al., Effects of State-Level Firearm Seller Accountability
Policies on Firearm Trafficking, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 525, 526–27 (2009). For the most recent
data, see generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, REPORT:
FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL STATISTICAL UPDATE (2018).
214 See About NICS, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/
nics/about-nics [https://perma.cc/NE2V-7KTN].
215 See 27 C.F.R. § 478.100(c); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS &
EXPLOSIVES, IMPORTANT NOTICE TO FFLS AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT GUN SHOWS
(2016), https://www.atf.gov/file/56651/download [https://perma.cc/CTA3-KLWQ].
216 See Garen J. Wintemute et al., Gun Shows and Gun Violence: Fatally Flawed
Study Yields Misleading Results, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH. 1856, 1857 (2010) (refuting a
recent flawed study and explaining the current data and scholarship on gun shows).
217 See Cook et al., Sources of Guns, supra note 88, at 30. A study examining juvenile
criminals involved in gun-related violence revealed that 70 percent of the crime guns were
acquired from private transactions such as a family member, friend, or other social
connection; only 10 percent of the inmates purchased a gun from a licensed dealer. See id.
218 See Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2016)
(injunction sought to stop Directorate of Defense Trade Controls from enforcing 3-D
printed gun regulations); James B. Jacobs & Alex Haberman, 3D-Printed Firearms, DoIt-Yourself Guns, & The Second Amendment, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 133, 136,
141–46 (2017) (discussing workshop guns and legal restraints).
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As one former ATF Director wrote, “[v]irtually every crime gun
in the United States starts off as a legal firearm.”219
A certain number of crime guns pass directly from the
licensed dealer to the prospective criminal, either because the
individual, though planning to commit crimes, has no criminal
record yet (and can pass a background check),220 or even because
the individual at the time of purchase has no criminal intent, but
makes this decision later.221 The end-user may also obtain the gun
semidirectly through a straw purchaser.222 A small percentage of
licensed dealers knowingly sell to criminals, either through
obvious straw purchasers or phony background checks: “A
national study of gun trafficking investigations found that corrupt
retail gun dealers accounted for more guns diverted into the illegal
market than any other single trafficking channel.”223 Even apart
from these notorious bad apples, the number of licensed gun
dealers in a locale strongly correlates to the number of intimate
partner homicides in the same area.224 These facts would justify a
personal consumer boycott; if more people choose to be
permanently gunless, fewer gun retailers would open or stay open.
Most crime guns, however, do not come directly from the
dealer, but instead belonged originally to someone else, i.e., a
lawful purchaser.225 “Eighty-five percent of guns traced to crime
were recovered from someone who was not the original retail
purchaser.”226 A would-be criminal can buy a used gun from an
unlicensed private seller in most states without a background
check, but this involves the risk that the seller may remember the
purchaser later when authorities investigate a crime. A safer
219 DEPT. OF TREASURY & BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, FOLLOWING
GUN: ENFORCING FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST FIREARMS TRAFFICKERS iii (2000)
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1622 [https://perma.cc/2RV8-KHF9].
220 See Donohue et al., supra note 20, at 206–07; see also Philip J. Cook, Gun Theft
and Crime, 95 J. URB. HEALTH 305, 305–06 (2018); Hemenway et al., supra note 12.
221 See Donohue et al., supra note 20, at 203–06.
222 See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2263 (2014) (conviction of
straw purchaser); United States v. Love, 767 F. Appx. 470, 471 (4th Cir. 2019) (defendant
used straw purchaser); United States v. Francis, 891 F.3d 888, 895, 898 (10th Cir. 2018)
(discussing the possibility of sentence enhancement for straw purchaser).
223 See Webster et al., supra note 213, at 526.
224 See Richard Stansfield & Daniel Semenza, Licensed Firearm Dealer Availability
and Intimate Partner Homicide: A Multilevel Analysis in Sixteen States, 126 PREVENTATIVE
MED. 1, 4 (2019).
225 See Philip J. Cook et al., The Last Link: From Gun Acquisition to Criminal
Use, 22 J. URB. HEALTH 1 (2019) (“Every transaction with a legitimate gun
dealer . . . entails a background check to determine if the would-be buyer is disqualified
by reason of his or her criminal history or other reason. As a result, relatively few active
criminals buy from gun stores, but rather obtain firearms from their social connections
or make other off-the-books transactions that constitute the underground gun market.”).
226 See Webster et al., supra note 213, at 526 (citing data from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF)).
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option, hypothetically, is to acquire a gun by theft or to buy a stolen
gun on the black market. Surveys of incarcerated offenders reveal
that theft is “the most common way that guns [are] obtained for
resale.”227 Up to five hundred thousand guns come into the hands
of criminals every year through theft,228 constantly replenishing
the supply of guns used in crimes and sold on the black market;
hundreds of thousands of guns with a zero wholesale basis (stolen)
suppresses the prices on black markets, making firearms more
affordable for the illegal purchasers. Regular gun owners—the
lawful ones—are the inadvertent middlemen between firearm
manufacturers and the criminal underworld.
On the black market, or “gray” secondary market,229 these
guns start with a wholesale basis of zero, which lowers the prices
on black markets, making firearms more affordable for
purchasers with bad intentions.230 Admittedly, even the higher
estimate of five hundred thousand is a tiny fraction of the thirteen
or fourteen million new guns sold every year—3 or 4 percent.231
One implication of this situation is that an abundant supply of
legally purchased guns means an abundant supply of guns to
steal, so the supply of legal guns will correlate with the supply of
crime guns.232 Conversely, scarcity of legal guns will mean scarcity
of crime guns.233 There is no reason to think that those engaged in
illegal activities have infinite resources or infinite access to
firearms, or that they are unaffected by price increases due to low

See HEMENWAY, supra note 24, at 119.
See id. at 118 (estimating the number at five hundred thousand per year, based
on a number of studies); Kaste, supra note 18 (reporting that an “NPR survey of a sampling
of police departments reveals steady increases in reports of guns stolen from vehicles”).
229 See HEMENWAY, supra note 24, at 148–49 (describing internet sales for
stolen and trafficked guns).
230 See Laura C. Morel, 82,000 Stolen Guns Are Missing in Florida, REVEAL NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.revealnews.org/article/82000-stolen-guns-are-missing-in-florida
[https://perma.cc/7Q7W-7WGX] (reporting that legal gun owners are arming criminals at an
alarming rate through the interstate black market); see also Jeff Asher & Mai Nguyen, Guns
Laws Stop at State Lines, But Guns Don’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, (Oct. 26, 2017), https://five
thirtyeight.com/features/gun-laws-stop-at-state-lines-but-guns-dont/ [https://perma.cc/C8Y3PPRZ] (noting that guns are transported in the black market across state lines from lenient
gun states to stricter states).
231 Even so, as a raw number rather than as a percentage, this quantity is
substantial, especially if we consider that there must be a finite black-market demand.
See Donohue et al., supra note 20, at 207–08 (discussing in detail the latest research on
stolen guns and their contribution to crime).
232 See Freskos, Stolen Guns in America, supra note 19.
233 Recent empirical evidence supports this claim. See David M. Hureau &
Anthony A. Braga, The Trade in Tools: The Market For Illicit Guns in High‐Risk Networks,
56 CRIMINOLOGY 510, 510 (2018) (“The results of our qualitative research reveal that gang
members and drug dealers pay inflated prices for [typically older] handguns diverted by
traffickers exploiting unregulated secondary market[s].”).
227
228
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supply;234 in fact, most criminal defendants in the United States
are low-income or indigent.235 Not owning any guns reduces the
supply of guns in society, and that is one reason not to own.
Owning a gun makes one partly responsible (3 or 4 percent per
gun owned) for the future aggregate supply of crime guns.236
Criminals do not have long-term arsenals;237 the black
market has high turnover and requires constant replenishment
of preowned guns.238 Contrary to the oft-repeated canard that
criminals will always have guns, empirical research suggests
that many urban centers have fragile illegal gun markets.239 The
evidence suggests that the underground gun market is thin,
with a limited number of reliable sellers, unsophisticated
buyers, and significant information deficits for both parties.240 A
gang or cartel may maintain an arsenal to help reduce these
hurdles, but in turn the leaders have an incentive to jealously
guard the weapons they’ve accrued, rather than make them
freely available to all members. There is good reason to believe,
therefore, that “[t]hin underground gun markets may be
particularly vulnerable to focused gun market disruption
strategies.”241 While this point usually arises in the context of
proposing tighter regulations of gun sales,242 a concerted effort
toward voluntary disarmament and product-type boycott by
regular citizens would also limit the number of firearms

See Douglas C. Bice & David D. Hemley, The Market for New Handguns: An
Empirical Investigation, 45 J.L. & ECON. 251 (2002) (analyzing the supply and demand
model for market gun transactions with respect to its impact on price, personal income,
expenditures on police protection, and lagged violent crime rates).
235 See Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry and Its Progeny, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1,
65 (1994) (observing that “a wealth of social science research suggests that most criminals
are socioeconomically deprived”).
236 Gun owners inadvertently contribute to gun violence by leaving guns in their
homes and cars. See J. Weston Phippen, The Problem With Leaving a Gun in Your Car,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/gun-cartheft/501017/ [https://perma.cc/3YLV-V6DU] (“[A] new study by researchers at Harvard and
Northeastern University [ ] found thieves steal between 300,000 and 600,000 firearms in the
U.S. every year. That’s 1,600 stolen guns every day, or more than one per minute.”).
237 The most recent studies indicate that most criminals obtain the guns they use
less than six months before committing their crime, and the median is two months, but the
average crime gun is nine years old. See Cook et al., Sources of Guns, supra note 88.
238 See id.
239 See Anthony A. Braga, Long-Term Trends in the Sources of Boston Crime
Guns, 3 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND.: J. SOC. SCI. 76, 77–78 (2017) (discussing empirical
evidence about illegal gun markets in Detroit, Chicago, and other cities).
240 See id.
241 Id. at 78.
242 See, e.g., Garen J. Wintemute, Where the Guns Come From: The Gun
Industry and Gun Commerce, 12 FUTURE CHILD. 55, 60–70 (2002) (discussing the legal
and illegal gun markets and suggesting regulatory interventions to limit the diversion
of guns from legal markets to illegal users).
234
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available for thieves to replenish the black market gun supply,
and would also shrink the market for local gun retailers.
Gun ownership can attract thieves rather than deterring
or deflecting them, according to empirical researchers.243 Guns
are valuable loot, with their high resale value and portability,244
and may be the most inviting item for theft after cash and
jewelry.245 If this is correct, guns often invite crime, rather than
deter it.246 Stolen guns offer a high return on effort compared to
other items criminals may steal.247 The more guns in the arsenal,
the more of a haul it would be—the thieves need only wait until
nobody is home, or nobody is awake.248
Moreover, each person’s ownership of a gun encourages
others in the community to acquire firearms as well—a
reciprocity affect that makes gun prevalence self-perpetuating,
even within the law-abiding community. If a primary reason for
purchasing firearms is self-defense against armed criminals,
then everyone would be better off if no one had a handgun; but
if some people have guns, then others need them to defend
themselves against those who already have them, and so on. If
individuals had an official means to declare their nonownership, it could mitigate this ratchet effect on gun
prevalence, and may even reverse it. A similar escalation effect
applies to the relationship between law-abiding gun owners and
crime guns. “Because bad guys illegally carry semiautomatic
pistols, law abiding citizens need semiautomatic pistols; because
the bad guys illegally carry AR-15s (to counter the
semiautomatic pistols), civilians need AR-15s, and so on.”249
Once the “law-abiding” citizens have guns, though, no one
243 See Hemenway et al., supra note 12 (“Gun owners were also more likely to
have guns stolen if they had six or more guns (4.5 vs. 1.7%), owned guns for protection (3.1
vs. 1.0%), carried guns in the past month (5.3 vs. 1.7%), did not store their guns in the
safest manner (2.9 vs. 1.0%) and, non-significantly, stored guns in their car (5.7 vs. 2.2%).”);
Sacerdote, supra note 12, at 108–09 (reviewing empirical research suggesting that guns
create an inducement to burglary rather than a deterrent).
244 See Cook & Ludwig, supra note 12, at 78.
245 See HEMENWAY, supra note 24, at 66 (“Homes with firearm collections are
considered prime targets for burglars.”); Cook & Ludwig, supra note 12, at 98 (“[G]uns are
valuable loot because they are portable and readily sold or fenced.”); Philip J. Cook & Jens
Ludwig, The Effects of Gun Prevalence on Burglary: Deterrence vs. Inducement 4 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8926, 2002) (“Guns in the home may pose a threat to
burglars, but also serve as an inducement, since guns are particularly valuable loot. Other
things equal, a gun-rich community provides more lucrative burglary opportunities than one
where guns are more sparse.”).
246 See Donohue et al., supra note 20, at 200; Cook & Ludwig, supra note 12, at 75–79.
247 See HEMENWAY, supra note 24, at 118 (recounting testimony from violent
offenders about how easy it was to steal guns).
248 See id. at 184–85 (surveying recent studies that show higher gun ownership
rates in a locale correlate with higher burglary rates).
249
See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 59, at 133.

2020]

GOING GUNLESS

225

suggests that the “criminals” just give up and go straight. They
simply pursue more and bigger guns. From a utilitarian
standpoint, gun ownership for self-defense creates a prisoner’s
dilemma. A seldom discussed point in the gun debates is why
criminals feel the need to have guns in the first place, if we
assume that they already have the advantages of surprise,
determination, and physical force. If fewer people had guns, and
the population that abstained from ownership could signal their
aggregate size in a reliable, official way, fewer would-be
criminals would feel the need to waste money and time to get a
gun; even though crimes may still occur, they would be violent
less often, and would result in fewer fatalities. If the program for
voluntary registration and certification became popular, there
would be less reason for a criminal to invest in a firearm and
take on the associated risks of acquiring it and carrying it.
Conversely, suppose that firearm ownership presents a
crowding-out problem, at least at the margins, by crowding out
other means of self-protection and crime reduction, some of which
are more efficient in terms of social welfare.250 Crowding can
occur either through opportunity costs, as when money invested
in firearms is then not available for upgrades to an electronic
security system, or through the perceived diminishing marginal
returns of alternative methods.251 Better locks, appropriate
fencing, owning a dog, and similar unexciting decisions reduce
the likelihood of criminal attacks, but gun ownership nudges
these other things out of consideration. To the extent that the
proposal in this article reduces gun ownership through voluntary
choices, it could also increase the use of other safety precautions,
many of which could have positive externalities or provide more
benefits than gun ownership offers.
Voluntary reductions in gun ownership can also reduce
the number of gun tragedies—again, without the problem of
placing restrictions on those who want to own guns. Family
arguments turn violent, tensions with neighbors escalate into
armed confrontations,252 and road rage incidents spiral out of
control, even for the otherwise law-abiding citizen.253 Alcohol and
drug abuse easily makes otherwise lawful gun owners a danger
250 See generally Emad H. Atiq, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding
Out Effect of Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1072 (2014).
251 See id.
252 See Goodson v. State, 824 S.E.2d 371, 373–74, 377 (Ga. 2019) (holding
defendant’s claim of self-defense unavailing when he shot the victim (an argumentative
neighbor) as he turned to flee, and continued shooting after the victim was on the ground
and no longer posed any threat).
253 See Donohue et al., supra note 20, at 6–8.
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to themselves or others.254 More than twenty thousand American
gun owners use their firearm to commit suicide every year,255 and
the correlation between having a firearm in the home with suicide
is well-documented.256 The Vars proposal addresses the problem
of suicide by gun for those who recognize that they are at risk; the
proposal in this article would also help reduce suicides for those
who have no history of depression or suicidal thoughts, but who
might experience such urges in the future, perhaps due to
unforeseen changes in circumstances. The point here is that if
voluntary disarmament reduces both the number of guns and the
number of households that have guns, then there should be a
corresponding drop in these tragedies—fewer arguments that
turn fatal, fewer misuses of firearms related to intoxication, and
fewer suicides. Domestic violence, including intimate partner
homicide, has a disturbingly high correlation with gun
ownership;257 voluntary reduction in firearm ownership could
reduce the number of intimate partner shootings and homicides.
Similarly, fewer gun owners would mean fewer
accidental shootings, which occur every day in America.258
Estimates of accidental or unintentional nonfatal shootings per
year number more than sixteen thousand,259 based on the Center
for Disease Control’s (CDC) data of hospital emergency room
254 See Haley Weiss, The Disturbing Trend Behind America’s Soaring Gun Deaths,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/12/gun-deathscity-murders-suicides/578812 [https://perma.cc/873F-2G4E]; Alcohol Poisoning Deaths, CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 2015), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/alcohol-poi
soning-deaths/index.html [https://perma.cc/JH9C-HWAU] (reporting that there are
approximately 2,200 alcohol poisoning deaths in the United States per year); What New
Opioid Laws Mean for Pain Relief, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Oct. 2018) https://www.health.
harvard.edu/pain/what-new-opioid-laws-mean-for-pain-relief [https://perma.cc/U8CW-G327]
(reporting that patients are legally prescribed opioids by their doctors, resulting in more than
115 deaths per day in the United States); Oquendo, supra note 21.
255 See Simonetti & Rowhani-Rahbar, supra note 22.
256 See sources cited supra note 23.
257 See, e.g., Natalie Nanasi, Disarming Domestic Abusers 5 (Mar. 12, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339061 (noting that the mere
presence of a gun in a domestic violence situation increases the likelihood of homicide by
500 percent); Aaron J. Kivisto et al., Association of State Firearm Legislation With
Female Intimate Partner Homicide, 56 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 311 (2019); Aaron
Edward Brown, This Time I’ll Be Bulletproof: Using Ex Parte Firearm Prohibitions to
Combat Intimate-Partner Violence, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159 (2019) (arguing in
favor of ex parte firearm prohibitions due to the high correlations of gun possession and
intimate partner homicides); Sarah Martin, Evidence-Based, Constitutionally-Sound
Approaches to Reducing Gun Fatalities in Violent Relationships, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 245,
253 (2018); Susan B. Sorenson & Douglas J. Wiebe, Weapons in the Lives of Battered
Women, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412, 1415–16 (2004).
258 See Deborah Azrael et. al., The Stock and Flow of U.S. Firearms: Results from
the 2015 National Firearms Survey, 3 RUSSEL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 38, 38–39 (2017)
(“[O]f the more than eighty thousand nonfatal firearm injuries, 60,470 were assault related,
15,928 were unintentional . . . injuries . . . . ”).
259 See, e.g., How Gun Policies Affect Unintentional Injuries and Deaths, supra
note 24 (number of emergency room discharges for nonfatal firearm injuries).
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discharges after treating unintentional, nonfatal gunshot
injuries in 2014. Unintentional fatal shootings number around
five hundred per year in recent years, according to numerous
sources.260 As Richard Posner and Tomas Philipson observed,
The social costs of guns are not limited to the direct monetary and
associated time costs (for search and training) and to their utility in
criminal activities, but they include the frequent accidents involving
guns, as where a child finds his parents’ gun and kills or injures
himself or another child with it.261

Of course, some other commonplace items, such as
knives,262 hedge trimmers,263 table saws,264 and other household
items265 cause even more accidental injuries each year. Even so,
most of these other items come under the regulatory purview of
the CPSC, which monitors annual accidents, mandates
manufacturer safety testing, orders product recalls, and so on—
but guns are a statutory exception under the Consumer Product
Safety Act.266 Accidents, including accidents involving children,
are part of the tradeoffs involved in the gun ownership
decision.267 Accident avoidance would be one benefit of going
gunless, among the many other benefits discussed above.

See, e.g., Azrael et al., supra note 258.
Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of
Crime, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405, 411 n.20 (1996).
262 See Gary A. Smith, Knife-Related Injuries Treated in United States
Emergency Departments, 1990–2008, 45 J EMERGENCY MED. 315, 315 (2013) (“An
estimated 8,250,914 . . . knife-related injuries were treated in US EDs from 1990 to 2008,
averaging 434,259 . . . injuries annually, or 1190 per day.”).
263 See Daniel S. Watson et. al., Trimming- and Pruning-Related Injuries in the
United States, 1990 to 2007, 72 J. TRAUMA ACUTE CARE SURGERY 257, 257 (2012)
(estimating thirty-six thousand emergency room visits per year for trimming/pruning
accidents, mostly around the home, and mostly from power tools).
264 See Kevin C. Chung & Melissa J. Shauver, Table Saw Injuries: Epidemiology
and a Proposal for Preventive Measures, 132 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 777,
777 (2013) (study showing that over thirty thousand table saw injuries occur every year).
265 See U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCTS SAFETY COMM’N, 2017 NEISS DATA HIGHLIGHTS
1 (2017), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/2017-Neiss-data-highlights.pdf?3i3POG9cN.rIyu2
ggrsUkD1XU_zoiFRP [https://perma.cc/D7VN-ZYKE]; Daniel S. Watson et al., Snow ShovelRelated Injuries and Medical Emergencies Treated In US Eds, 1990 to 2006, 29 AM. J
EMERGING MED. 11 (2011) (estimating an average 11,500 emergency room visits per year for
snow shovel injuries); Gary A. Smith & D. Vollman, Epidemiology of Lawn-Mower-Related
Injuries to Children in the United States, 1990–2004, 118 PEDIATRICS 273, 273 (2006) (noting
children suffered “an average of 9400 injuries annually, or 11.1 injuries per 100,000 US
children per year”); Jennifer McGeehan et al., Escalator-Related Injuries Among Children in
the United States, 1990–2002, 118 PEDIATRICS 279, 281 (2006) (an average of two thousand
children injured by escalators per year, based on emergency room visits).
266 See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(5)(ii)(E) (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 4181(1954)).
267 See Marjorie S. Hardy et. al., Behavior-Oriented Approaches to Reducing
Youth Gun Violence, 12 FUTURE CHILD. 101, 107 (2002).
260
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CONCLUSION
The registration program set forth in this article would help
the movement to prevent gun violence to form a collective social
identity to disrupt the status quo. Many Americans are currently
conscientious abstainers—they see guns as a scourge on our
society, a source or symbol of violence, and they would welcome a
way to signal their moral opposition to firearms. By providing
identification markers such as government-issued certificates
declaring individuals as legally “gunless,” these Americans can
mobilize to match the intensity of Second Amendment advocates.
Pledges, registration, and certification are crucial identification
markers that foster group coherence, camaraderie, and
recruitment in a social movement. At the same time, registration
and certification would aid in formalizing or solemnizing a decision
to forsake gun ownership, adding gravitas to this personal choice.
Self-signaling devices like this are important for personal growth
and moral development. For decades, pro-gun organizations have
successfully marshalled their membership to oppose all gun
regulations by cultivating an influential social group identification.
By contrast, Americans against gun ownership presently have no
means of declaring their common identity.
This article provides a roadmap by which Americans who
share a genuine commitment to being “gunless” can organize to
form a base of grassroots power. As set forth above, such a
program would require only minimal additions to the federal
and state background check systems that already exist; this is a
low-cost, high-benefit proposal. The only burden on the
government would be the issuance of a simple certification card
to those who voluntarily register. At the same time, the system
would be entirely voluntary, honoring the choices and free
expression of those who want to renounce gun ownership, while
not infringing on the rights of those who want to bear arms. This
program would therefore be cost-efficient, in addition to
providing sorely needed information that is currently lacking
regarding the connections between gun possession, safety, and
crime. Insurance companies and other market actors could
determine, from an actuarial basis, some of the externalities of
gun ownership and respond accordingly. Certifying gun
abstinence would correct an information asymmetry that
currently exists—an asymmetry that can cause market failures
in risk management. The private sector could work in tandem
with this program, reflecting the true societal costs of gun
ownership. In addition, the program outlined here offers a
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promising way to reduce the number of firearms in circulation
without restricting gun sales to normal purchasers, or the
activities of those who want to own guns.
Official certification as gunless would be irrevocable for a
period of several years (i.e., five, if not more). If you do not
happen to need or want a gun now, but you could conceive of
needing or wanting one sometime in the next few years, this
program is not for you. Gunless certification is for those of us
who believe there is no circumstance in which we could ever need
a gun—there are other ways (much better ways)—to avoid crime
or injury besides arming oneself to kill others. Irrevocable
commitments may be a foreign concept to many Americans
today, but our legal system does recognize a few irrevocable, but
voluntary, decisions. Enlistment in the military is extremely
difficult to retract or revoke, even if the person has a complete
change of heart and mind, or a dramatic change in family
circumstances, as are some other opt-in and opt-out choices
within the military.268 Similarly, those who avail themselves of
one of the Social Security opt-out alternatives, such as the
optional exemption for ministers who have a conscientious
objection to the Social Security program, cannot revoke their
decision later, even if they change religion or denominational
affiliation and want to participate in Social Security.269 In the
case of renouncing gun ownership, the permanence of the choice
(at least for a term of years), is indispensable to give certification
its force and verve as an effective signaling device, whether for
peers in the movement, for oneself, or for the marketplace.
The time has come for conscientious people to renounce
gun ownership for good. We need a different culture, a new
mindset about relying on violence and physical force. We need
ways to exemplify that we have vowed to abstain from arming
ourselves to kill others in a moment of crisis. Change begins
locally with individuals who are willing to publicly identify as
legally gunless, creating a shift in the social norm of owning a
gun. It is time for those who oppose the culture of militarism and
violence to stand and identify themselves as persons who choose
not to own guns. Registration and certification provide a legal
mechanism for the gunless to do just that.

268

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 510(f)–(g) (examples of irrevocable opt-in and opt-out

provisions).
269 See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(e)(4) (“An exemption received pursuant to this
subsection shall be irrevocable.”).

